Litigation Strategies and Judicial Review Under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 by Kushner, James A.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 11
January 1976
Litigation Strategies and Judicial Review Under
Title I of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974
James A. Kushner
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
James A. Kushner, Litigation Strategies and Judicial Review Under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 11 Urb.
L. Ann. 37 (1976)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/3
LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
UNDER TITLE I OF THE HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974
JAMES A. KUSHNER*
Since the origin of the Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal Program
of 1949,' federal community development programs have been plagued
with .red tape,2 delay' and often ineffective results.4 Another serious
problem with prior community development schemes was their delivery
in the form of categorical grants, each requiring separate applications,
review, strictly defined purpose, and a requirement for local financial
contribution.5 The massive amount of planning and administrative
duplication, together with the relatively narrow spectrum of eligible
community development activities tended to impose a system of
dominance by Washington over local land use planning. Communities
planned and implemented programs, not so much upon the basis of
locally perceived priorities as on what federal grants were currently
available. This system represented a de facto encouragement of non-
planning despite lofty Congressional rhetoric to the contrary. 6 Such
*Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University. B.B.A., University of Miami,
1967; J.D., University of Maryland, 1968.
1. Housing Act of 1949 tit. 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-69 (1970).
2. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY
152-69 (1968) (known as the "'Douglas Comm'n"); cf. Hearings on Red Tape - Inquiring
Into Delays and Excessive Paperwork in Administration of Public Works Programs Before
the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
3. Hearings on Red Tape, supra note 2.
1. BuILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 2, at 152-69. See also LeGates, Can the
IS'elfare Bureaucracies Control Their Programs: The Case of HUDand Urban Renewal, 5
URBAN LW. 228 (1973).
5. See Fishman, Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: New
Federal and Local Dynamics in Community Development, 7 URBAN LAW. 189, 189-90
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Fishman].
6. E.g.. 42 U.S.C, § 1451 (1970). See note 209 infra for materials relating to the Workable
Program requirement.
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concerns, conbined with promises of the "New Federalism," resulted in
passage of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.7
Although the administration favored carte blanche delegation of
responsibility in the form of pure revenue sharing,8 Congress, concerned
with national goals and performance, held out for a far more
sophisticated package. While offering simplicity, vastly increased
efficiency and flexibility, the resulting program also retains standards
comparable to its predecessors. It creates some new requirements and
expectations, which if effectively and aggressively implemented could
make a sizeable contribution toward remedying this nation's housing
and community development crisis. This Article will explore the
strengths and weaknesses of these program requirements, and will
attempt to forecast the litigable issues that might be raised, and in doing
so assess the potential for judicial intervention.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO TITLE I OF THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AcT OF 1974
In combining virtually all of the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) prior grant-in-aid com-
munity development programs into a block grant entitlement concept,
Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 19749
(HCDA) creates a deceptively simple package.10 HCDA reorders
responsibilities for compliance with community development standards
both by delegating to recipients the tasks of environmental assessment
and relocation planning, and by greatly increasing the number of
recipients, thus precluding the previously existing opportunity of HUD
to carry out detailed program review. These factors, together with the
controversial nature of certain program requirements and lack of
7. Pub. L. No. 93-383,88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15,20,3 1, 40,42,
49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1974)).
8. See generally Fishman, supra note 5.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-17 (Supp. IV, 1974).
10. For a general discussion of the Act see H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, IN-ZONING:
A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 59-78 (1975); R.
Alexander & M. Nenno, NAHRO, A Local Housing Assistance Plan (1974); R. Maffin, E.
Silverman & D. Sosson, NAHRO, Chart Book: For Plotting a Local Community
Development Course Under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
(1975); Fishman, supra note 5; Kushner, Community Planning and Development Under
the Housing and Community Development Act of11974,8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 661 (1975);
Salsich, Community Development - Some Reflections on the Latest Federal Initiative, 19
ST. Louis U.L.J. 293 (1975).
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experience with the law, have already resulted in legal challenges. The
consequence, therefore, could be excessive delay in achieving the intent
of the new law, causing further postponement of the commitment to
provide "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family."'"
As has already been noted, the most striking change brought about by
the HCDA is the switch from the traditional project oriented grant-in-
aid application procedures for community development to a block grant
"special revenue sharing" approach. 12 Another significant development
is a recognition of the relationship between development policy, or
perhaps more accurately redevelopment policy, and housing. In
addition, Congress recognized the devastating effects of racial and
economic isolation occurring in the central cities and has provided a
mandate to achieve integration and deconcentration of housing
opportunity.
While the language of the HCDA is, for the most part, broad and
general, it is at times quite specific. As a result the HCDA requires some
dissection in order to be better understood. After delineating eligible
activities13 and the fund allocation system,14 the Act sets out application
and review requirements.' 5 There are also sections of the Act devoted to
reporting, 6 Secretarial remedies for noncompliance 7 and authorizing
regulations for performance standards.18 For purposes of the discussion
that follows, the application for Title I funds is divided into three parts:
(1) a three-year summary plan, (2) designation of a program of specific
projects to be undertaken, and (3) a housing assistance plan (HAP). 9
11. Preamble to the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448,
82 Stat. 476.
12. The block grants replace the following categorical grant programs: urban renewal,
code enforcement, interim assistance, model cities, water and sewer facilities,
neighborhotd facilities, open space land, urban beautification, historic preservation and
rehabilitation grants. See S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1974).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 5305 (Supp. IV, 1974).
11. Id. §§ 5303,5306-07. See generally Hirshen & LeGates, HUD's Bonanza for Suburbia,
39 Tur PROGRESSIVE 32 (1975); Kushner, supra note 10, at 663-64; Salsich, supra note 10, at
300-02.
15.42 U.S.C. § 5304 (Supp. IV, 1974).
16. Id. § 5313.
17. Id. § 5311.
18. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 570 (1975). For the most current status of the various parts of pt. 570
see the affected sections published in the Federal Register subsequent to April, 1975.
19. For a description of the HAP requirement see notes] 14-182 andaccompanying text
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This Article will first examine the application requirements with
regard to both community development activities and the housing
assistance plan in an attempt to analyze the potential forjudicial review.
Under the community development section this Article will address the
need to plan eligible activities, the problem of whether communities can
use HCDA funds to replace local resources previously programmed for
planned activities, citizen participation requirements and civil rights
considerations. With regard to the housing assistance plans, problems of
both the central city and the suburban community will be addressed
with primary focus on civil rights considerations in the location of
housing and problems of exclusionary suburban communities. This
Article will then explore performance standards relating to execution of
the recipient's plan. This section examines the recipient's plan with
regard to problems of relocation, equal opportunity and civil rights,
citizen participation, maintenance of local financial efforts to support
community development activities and ineligible activities, as well as
the housing assistance plans as they pertain to implementation,
exclusionary land use restrictions and project site selection.
The Article will next address attempts to avoid program re-
quirements. In doing so this work will examine performance standards
and program requirements together with a summary of available
judicial remedies, in the context of potential and pending litigation, so
that issues and pitfalls of noncompliance can be recognized at the outset.
Despite the ostensible revenue-sharing approach of the HCDA, the Act
calls for relatively elaborate application and reporting requirements.
These requirements, although at times giving rise to judicially
enforceable standards, in certain instances represent, at best, hollow
rhetoric. The purpose of this section of the Article is to help avoid time-
consuming, expensive litigation, that too often proves pyrrhic, by
isolating crucial application and reporting requirements, and thereby
alerting HUD block grant recipients and other concerned parties to
issues that should be addressed at the earliest possible stage. Lastly, this
Article will discuss the applicability of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) to the HCDA.
In examining the various requirements of the HCDA and potential
noncompliance problems, careful attention should be given to the
symbiotic relationship that Congress intended for community develop-
infra. For a general o erview of the initial experience with the HCDA and activities begun
under it see U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Community Development Block Grant
Program, Provisional Report, May 1975.
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ment (CD) activities and housing assistance plans. If conscientiously
and aggressively adhered to, the requirements of the HCDA will provide
a systematic approach toward the problems of housing and community
development. While the implementation of the new law will no doubt
lack a large measure of its planned effectiveness, due in part to the failure
to legislate ambitious performance standards, one must appreciate the
long-awaited congressional recognition that inner-city strategies must
be linked to outer-city programs if any inroads are to be made toward
providing a remedy to our urban pathology.
II. THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AcTIVITIEs APPLICATION
As previously indicated, the application must exhibit a three year
summary plan of community development goals in addition to a
program of specific projects to be undertaken within the year
immediately following application approval. The essence of the
application requirement, as described in HUD's regulations, is the
identification of needs and a plan of activities to address those needs.2 0
Regarding planned activities, the application must cover the program
year and should indicate the estimated costs and general location of the
activities on accompanying maps.2'
A. Identification of Need for Community Development Activities
The Act specifies that the application must set forth a "summary of a
three-year community development plan which identifies community
development needs. '22 The proper identification of need is a critical step
in designing a community development program which will achieve the
HCDA's broad congressional goals.23 Communities may inaccurately
assess their developmental needs in several ways. These could range in
significance from the failure to recognize blighting influences to the
underestimation of the number of existing substandard dwelling units.
Underestimating may occur as part of a strategy to keep housing
20. The plan shall be written in a manner to encompass the needs, strategy and
objectives, and to describe a program, which is designed to eliminate or prevent
slums, blight, and deterioration where such conditions or needs exist, and to
provide improved community development facilities and public improvements,
including the provision of supporting health, social and similar services where
necessary and appropriate.
21 C.F.R. § 570.303(a) (1975).
21. Id. § 570.303(b).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(a) (1975).
23..See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301(c), (d) (Supp. IV, 1974). See also 24 C.F.R. § 570.2 (1975).
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assistance plan requirements to a minimum or to provide an overture to
proposing activities such as downtown renewal, sports and convention
complexes, and other proposals primarily benefiting business and
industry, priorities often far removed from immediate strategies to
eliminate blight and slums and to improve lower-income housing and
living opportunities. In assessing needs recipients must also be acutely
sensitive to the special needs of certain segments of the population, such
as problems of housing and employment access often faced by
minorities, and the existence of architectural barriers for the physically
handicapped.2 4
Perceiving the possibility that recipients may fail to adequately
address community development needs, Congress specifically provided
for review of needs treatment in the application approval process:
The Secretary shall approve an application. . . unless (1) on the
basis of significant facts and data, generally available and
pertaining to community and housing needs and objectives, the
Secretary determines that the applicant's description of such needs
and objectives is plainly inconsistent with such facts or data...21
The legislative history provides an illustration of the inconsistency
notion:
[I]f a community's application asserted that it had little or no need
24. In identifying the needs, theapplicant "shall take into consideration and summarize
any special needs found to exist in any identifiable segment of the total group of lower-
income households in the community." Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(c)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. 7504
(1976). An attack on the application on thegrounds of inconsistency is strongly supported
by City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976). See notes 120-36 and
accompanying text infra. A Dallas, Texas, application has been attacked on the grounds of
inconsistency for failing to recognize the need for integrated housing given that 93% of the
black families reside in certain census tracts. Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No.
3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filedJuly 23, 1975), reported in Community Dev. Digest, Aug. 19,
1975, at 1-2.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2)(i) (1975).
Challenges based on the Secretarial review provisions would be made under the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d
809 (3d Cir. 1970); North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir.
1970); City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D Conn, 1976). As HUD has made no
provision in its regulations to allow administrative complaints by the public or even
recipients, exhaustion of remedies posed no hurdle to HCDA litigation. Nevertheless,
where practicable, an administrative complaint made to HUD can establish quite early the
sincerity of the claimant, provide notice to all parties of the nature and seriousness of the
dispute, and open the possibility for settlement as well as eliminate any claim of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. See English v. Town of Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 448 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tor housing for lower income families despite census figures
showing large numbers of substandard dwellings and housing
overcrowding, the community's assertion would be 'plainly
inconsistent' with facts and data available to the community and
HUD. On the other hand, if a community proposes to improve
housing in census tract 'X' in a particular year, but census figures
show that the problem is somewhat worse in census tract 'Y', the
Committee does not expect HUD to second guess that decision.26
A litigation challenge for "inconsistency" between real needs and
stated needs is limited because real needs must be evidenced by facts and
data that are "generally available." This would appear to preclude the
preparation of studies for the purpose of contesting the needs analysis.
While the legislative history cites census data as representative, HUD
regulations define "generally available" as "published data accessible to
both the applicant and the Secretary, such as census data,... recent
local, areawide or State comprehensive planning data.' 27 Thus, census
data,28 governmental agency studies, General Neighborhood Renewal
Plans (GNRP),29 Community Renewal Program Studies (CRP),30 prior
Workable Program applications or private consultant studies might be
used. If prior studies also lack the precision of the CD application,
however, there may not be any studies available that could contradict the
application.
B. The Relationship of Planned Activities
to Community Development Needs
Perhaps the most common problem to be anticipated under the
community development program will be a community's designation of
26. H.R. REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9(1974) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
1114]. The House provisions were adopted by the Conference Committee. CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE, JoINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF
CONFERENCE, IN SUBCONtM. ON HOUSING OF HOUSE CoMi. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
93D CONG., 2D SESS., COMPILATION OF THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT
OF 197-1, 297, 302 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
27. 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2)(i) (1975).
28. Census data may be of limited value as "substandard housing" was eliminated as a
census data requirement in 1970. It was replacedby a category indicating lack of plumbing
facilititvs that may grossly underestimate housing need. Further, 1970 census figures may
be obsolete.
29. The GNRP consisted of renewal planning in areas larger than those specifically
propowd for urban renewal project treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
30. The CRP was designed to perform preliminary planning for future renewal needs.
Id. § 1153(d) (1970).
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activities that fail to significantly address the community development
needs described in the application. This issue will often take the form of
criticism of perceived priorities and will thus often be a most difficult
issue to litigate due to the significant range of discretion which
decisionmakers are permitted by reviewing courts. There may be
situations, however, that present such glaring deviations from obvious
needs that courts will find a prima facie failure to correlate planned
expenditures with needs.3 1 A similar problem will arise when an
application describes planned activities in such a vague and general
31. The application for Honolulu, Hawaii, proposes to spend nearly $9 million of its
almost $12 million grant in its first program year for planning what appears to be a new
town outside the city. An additional $1.2 million will be used for recreation programs,
principally tennis courts, a skating rink, and recreation buildings. These priority
expenditures are being made in the absence of any funds programmed for housing
preservation despite a HAP indicating over 19,000 substandard dwelling units, 17,000 of
which are considered suitable for rehabilitation. HUD, Application for Federal
Assistance, Community Development Block Grant Program, City and County of
Honolulu, Hawaii, Apr., 1975. Kingston, New York, has programmed only $10,000 for
code enforcement despite a high degree of housing suitable for rehabilitation and a large
housing need unmet by proposed housing starts. Of the $1.3 million entitlement, no funds
are programmed for housing rehabilitation while $375,000 is allocated to remodel the
existing municipal auditorium. HUD, Application for Federal Assistance, Community
Development Block Grant Program, City of Kingston, New York, Feb., 1975. This
application has nevertheless survived its first attack. See Ulster County Community
Action Comm., Inc. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The first extensive review
of an application attack was made in Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v.
Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). Plaintiffs there challenged the inclusion of
allegedly ineligible activities (including acquisition and renovation of a theater and
railroad depot, and a feasibility study for a 1980 World's Fair) and further, that the
proposed activities involved no blight. The court, finding HUD's application approval to
be reasonable, stated that the Act envisioned a minimum of second guessing on HUD's
initial application review. The court based its ruling for defendants on the ground of
ripeness, but indicated that if HUD failed to assure compliance, the court might then
intervene. Id. at 788-90. It appears that plaintiffs misconstrued the Act, as neither of their
claims follow from the Act itself. Additionally they should have considered the
"inconsistency" and "inappropriateness" standards of the HCDA. See notes 22-43 and
accompanying text supra and infra. See Ulster County Community Action Comm., Inc. v.
Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also NAACP v. Hills, Civil No. C-75-2257-
WHO (N.D. Cal., Mar. 19, 1976) (expenditures forcommercial renewal reasonable in light
of some attention given to housing needs and activities devoted to blight elimination).
Corning, New York, has proposed the use of nearly half of its first year allocation for
construction of a heated skating rink, half to construct a new water reservoir, with $9,000
remaining for code enforcement in the face of a tight housing supply, proposed
displacement, an anticipated increase in migrating lower-income families, and a
substantial number of dwelling units suitable for rehabilitation. HUD, Application for
Federal Assistance, Community Development Block Grant Program, Coming, N.Y. Feb.
19, 1975.
A more difficult problem is presented when a community is receiving funds based solely
upon the "hold-harmless" provisions of the Act permitting communities to receive HUD
funds due to prior categorical on-going programs that were approved prior to HCDA. 12
[Vol. 11:37
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manner that it is impossible to determine what the nature and extent of
activities would be in any section of the city.
3 2
US.C. § 5306(g) (Supp. IV, 1974). See also 24-C.F.R. §570.103 (1975). For example, the city
of Corona, California, has programmed its entire first year's funds for a closeout of its
cntral business district renewal program, with a small portion directed toward planning
activities for its housing element and HAP in the face of a significant lower-income
housing problem. HUD, Application for Federal Assistance, Community Development
Block Grant Program, Corona, Cal., Apr. 15, 1975. Receiving funds solely by virtue of the
recently approved urban renewal project appears to ignore the clear substantive
requirements of the Act as hold-harmless provisions are located only in the allocations
sections and no exemption for using the funds in this way has been provided in the
remainder of the Act.
32. For example, the Philadelphia application simply listed 239 census tracts that would
receive rehabilitation loans and grants, 94 where acquisition for clearance would occur,
150 where demolition would take place, and 129 where rehabilitation of recreation
facilities would occur. HUD, Application for Federal Assistance, Community Develop-
ment Block Grant Program, Philadelphia, Pa., Apr., 1975. The Act calls for the "general
location" for planned activities. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). See also Final
HUD Reg. § 570,303(b)(1)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,701 (1975). In addition, HUD's regulations
require maps indicating the "general location" of activities. Id. § 570.303(b)(2). The
Philadelphia application simply included a map showing census tracts with accom-
pan'ing lists of tracts under the various planned activities. This use of census tracts alone
without describing the extent of activity would seem to comply with the "general
location" requirement, but it no doubt resulted from a misreading of the HUD
regtulations. The regulations, in requiring maps, also require the submission of census
tract maps disclosing "concentrations of minority groups and lower-income persons." Id.
This issue is also raised in Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D
(N.D. Tex., filed July 23, 1975), reported in Community Dev. Digest, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1-2.
It is interesting to note that the statute calls not only for the "general location" but also
for the "'estimated costs." 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). It could be argued that
these terms read together would require, at a minimum, a breakdown of estimated costs by
centis tract. This would provide an indication of the extent, if not the nature, of proposed
activities, allowing residents of the tract to meet and influence how the funds will be
expended. This argument is bolstered by the legislative history. The Conference
Committee adopted the House language of the section rejecting the Senate version that
simply required that "the application should be brief rather than elaborate and should
focus on describing the elements of a program rather than the details of a project." S. REP.
No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1114, supra note 26, at 6.
The Secretarial review provisions of the Act provide a tool to deal with vagueness
problems: "'The Secretary shall approve an application ... unless ... (3) the Secretary
dct rmin-s that the application does not comply with the requirements of this
chapter . 1... 2 U.S.C. § 530t(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2)(iii)
(1975); note 25 supra. Thus, HUD could request additional information, but once it
approvcd the application judicial relief probably would be limited to denying all funds or
den ying funds designated for the vaguely defined activities. In addition, HUD approval of
an al)plication lacking sufficient activity description would arguably be arbitrary in light
of the requirement that proposed activities be appropriate to needs and objectives. 42
1 %S.C, § 530 l( )(2) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2)(ii) (1975); notes33-35 and
a(companying text infra. A third approach to the vagueness problem would be the overall
NEPA environmental impact statement requirement. See generally notes 233-69 and
aco tmpanying text infra. Remedies in this area could call foreitheran application rewrite
with specificitv, the denial of partial or total funds due to the inability to determine
19761
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The Act covers the potential failure of planned activities to address
community development needs in a section providing for HUD review:
"The Secretary shall approve an application ... unless-. . . (2) on the
basis of the application, the Secretary determines that the activities to be
undertaken are plainly inappropriate to meeting the needs and
objectives identified by the applicant . . . . -33 Where inappropriate
activities are programmed, HUD could request a revised application
during the seventy-five day review period.3 4 If the amendment is not
timely, however, the Secretary may disapprove all or part of the
application.3 5
An additional base to question a community's funding priorities is in
the Act's requirement that the applicant certify:
[T]o the satisfaction of the Secretary that its Community
Development Program has been developed so as to give maximum
feasible priority to activities which will benefit low- or moderate-
income families or aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or
blight. The Secretary may also approve an application describing
activities which the applicant certifies and the Secretary deter-
mines are designed to meet other community development needs
having a particular urgency as specifically described in the
application.36
While this provision, on its face, would not appear to be very
meaningful where a community pursued programs that, while not
appropriateness, or the preparation and review of an environmental impact statement.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2)(ii) (1975). The
legislative history provides an illustration of the section's applicability: "HUD would be
expected to look beyond an application which, for example, proposed only minimal
activities to improve housing despite the application's identification of substantial
housing needs." H.R. REP. No. 1114, supra note 26, at 9. The "inappropriateness"
strategy is greatly strengthened by the decision in City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp.
889 (D. Conn. 1976). See notes 120-25 and accompanying text infra.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1114, supra note 26, at 8-9. HUD reports that the average application
review and approval process takes 49 days. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv.,
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT EXECIYrVE
SUMMARY 1, (Dec. 1975).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.306(b)(2)(iii), (c), (d);
H.R. REP. No. 1114, supra note 26, at 8-10, 49-50. While the House Report would seem to
indicate the existence of discretion to deny all or part of the funds, it is believed that the
partial withholding relates to certain inappropriate activities, and that it would be
arbitrary to place a dollar value on the misrepresentation of need. The real relief necessary
would be a rewrite of the program of activities to be carried out - a remedy unavailable
under the Act.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974); see 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(e)(7) (1975).
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addressing lower-income needs, were designed to eliminate blight or
address urgent community development needs, the legislative history
discloses that the provision contains a mandate to address the needs of
low- and moderate-income families. While a plain reading of the
provision would appear to permit a reading of the word "or" in the
disjunctive, Congress clearly intended that the provisions be read in the
conjunctive. Both the House 7 and Senate 8 versions of the Act called for
emphasis on addressing the needs of the poor. The final conference
report made it clear that activities proposed by recipients must address
such needs.39 In addition, the certification provision clearly would
provide a vehicle to question the overall scheme of planned activities
that, while related to community development needs and thus perhaps
susceptible to being labeled "appropriate," were not directed at the
needs of lower-income persons or the elimination or prevention of
blight.4 0
The term "maximum feasible priority" lends further vagueness to the
provision. The obvious interpretation would be that not all proposed
activities need comply with the limitation but that some substantial
amount must benefit the poor or help eliminate blight. The legislative
history sheds no light on this issue, as the phrase was born in Conference
Committee without comment.4 If the certification is recognized as a
37. The House Bill required that an application describe a program designed to: "(i)
eliminate or prevent slums, blight, and deterioration where such conditions or needs exist;
and (ii) provide improved community facilities and public improvements, including the
provision of supporting health, social, and similar services where necessary and
appropriate." H.R. 15361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(a)(6)(3) (1974) (emphasis added). See
also H.R. REP. No. 1114, supra note 26, at 6, 49.
38. The Senate Bill required an application to include programs: "(B) to prevent and
eliminate slums and blight, and upgrade deteriorated neighborhoods through renewal,
code enforcement, and other community improvement programs; and (C) to improve and
upgrade community services and facilities and to provide increased economic oppor-
tunities for residents in areas affected by community development activities, particularly
those residents with low or moderate incomes." S. 3066, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 308(a)(1)
(1974) (emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 693, supra note 32, at 134.
39. "[AJll applicants must propose activities to eliminate slums and blight where such
conditions or needs exist, provide housing for low and moderate income persons, and
improve and upgrade community facilities and services where necessary." CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 26, at 300.
,10. An obvious illustration might be a need for recreation facilities and planned
expenditures for a network of tennis courts that might not even be accessible to the poor.
For example see the discussion of the Honolulu and Corning, New York, applications
discussed at note 31 supra.
41. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 301. An analogue to the Conference
Committee's language is the promise of "maximum feasible participation" found in the
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substantive performance standard, remedies for violation could
conceivably result in the denial of all application funds or the denial of
at least a portion of funds directed to activities that do not fall within the
bounds of the certification.42
A third strategy for potential litigation would be to seek the
preparation of an environmental impact statement under NEPA on the
overall program application.43
1964 Economic Opportunity Act provisions creating the Community Action Agencies.
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 § 201, 78 Stat. 516. See generally D. MOYNIHAN.
MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (1969). The phrase was subsequently picked up in
the 1970 amendments to the United States HousingAct that called for"maximum feasible
participation" by tenants in the development and operation of tenant programs and
services. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(6) (1970). This language was repeated in the assisted housing
provisions of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 3(4), 42 U.S.C. §
1437(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974). One should also consider the requirement that to the "greatest
extent feasible," employment and training opportunities should be provided to lower-
income housing and community development project area residents. 12 U.S.C. § 1701(u)
(1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). Daniel P. Moynihan observed in his work on the
O.E.O. legislation that the provision was virtually ignored in hearings and in the
legislative history, and is still undefined. MOYNIHAN, supra, at 87-91, 179. It remains to be
seen whether the certification provision rises above pure language, or, like the promises of
the "war on poverty" results in "soaring rhetoric" and "minimum performance." Id. at
203. One indication that the "maximum feasible participation" requirement connotes a
substantive standard is the experience under HUD's modernization program. The
regulations called for only "involvement" of the tenants in the plans and programs for
modernization, changes in management and policies, and expanded services and facilities.
U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., Low-Rent Housing, The Modernization Program
Handbook, RHA 7485.1(a)(3) (June, 1969). Utilizing this "involvement" standard, the
sending out of questionaires to tenants regarding desired changes and personally
contacting most tenants was held to satisfy the regulation. Drake v. Crouch, 377 F. Supp.
722 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), aff'd mer., 471 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1972). One might suspect that
".maximum feasible participation" would entail a more significant amount of involve-
ment.
42. Interpretation of the provision was sought in NAACP v. Hills, Civil No. 75-1,161
(D.N.J., filed Aug. 22, 1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 422 (1975), but a
settlement was reached. 3 HOUSING & DEe. REP. CURRENT DEv. 865 (1976); see note 273
infra. An interpretation was also sought in Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No.
3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filedJuly 23, 1975), reported in Community Dev. Digest. Aug. 19,
1975, at 1-2. Defendant's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied
without comment on the specific issue. Bois D'Arc Patroits v. City of Dallas, Civil No. 3-
75-0906-D (N.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 1975). In another case an attempt to interpret the provision
was summarily rejected on the basis that "approval of the plan of HUD is prima facie an
indication of the fact that defendant City has complied with these basic requirements."
Ulster County Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986, 990
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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C. Need to Plan Eligible Activities
The Act and regulations specify eligible activities,"4 with the
regulations also identifying certain ineligible activities. 45 The inclusion
of one or more ineligible activities in an application is a distinct
possibility under the Act. For example, the Honolulu proposal to spend
nearly $9,000,000 of its almost $12,000,000 -grant on planning,
engineering and site preparation for a new town "out-of-town" housing
development appears to be an activity of questionable eligibility. 6 A
preliminary survey of community development applications conducted
by HUD disclosed that twenty-three percent of all applications
contained proposed activities which were "clearly ineligible or
illegal. '4 7 There is a fear within HUD that actual expenditures on
ineligible activities will be even more significant.48 Given this
premonition, it is probable that such ineligible activities will be
inappropriate for community development needs, thus leaving the
application susceptible to HUD review and litigation.4 9 HUD could
request an application amendment pending review, but relief thereafter
would be limited to withholding funds intended for such ineligible
activities.
D. Maintenance of Local Efforts
In the findings and purpose section of Title I, Congress clearly
evidenced its intent that HCDA funds not be used to replace any
previous locally provided resources: "It is the intent of Congress that the
Federal assistance made available under this title not be utilized to
reduce substantially the amount of local financial support for
community development activities below the level of such support prior
to the availability of such assistance." 50
11. 12 U.S.C. § 5305(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
15.21 C.F.R. § 570.201 (1975); Final HUD Reg. § 570.201, 41 Fed. Reg. 2767-68 (1976).
16. HUD, Application for Federal Assistance, Community Development Block Grant
Program, City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii, Apr., 1975.
17. 2 HovsiNG & DEv. REP. CURRENT DEe. 1047 (1975) (statement of Donald G. Dodge,
Director. Office of Evaluation for Community Planning, HUD).
18.3 Ho'sxoG & DEV. REP. CURRENT DEV. 401-04 (1975). HUD has announced that it will
make no attempt to recapture funds spent during the first year for ineligible activities.
Housing Affairs Letter No. 75-43, at 6, Oct. 31, 1975.
19. See Knoxville Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975); Ulster County Community Action Comm. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
50. -12 U.S.C. § 5301(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). HUD's regulations implementing the Act
spc(ifically employed that mandate in the substantive section of their rules. The
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Issues could easily arise if a community planned to use HCDA funds
for activities previously funded from local resources. The phrase "reduce
substantially" weakens the efficacy of this provision because of the
openendedness of the language, but where an entire activity is taken over
with CD funds it would, nevertheless, appear to meet the "substantial"
requirement. Although this provision is located in the purpose and
finding section, HUD's implementing regulation gives it force,
especially in light of the long-standing doctrine of judicial deference to
an agency's interpretation of its own statute. 5 To interpret this
provision differently might result in the conclusion that the HCDA
could be used for local tax relief, a conclusion not supported by the
eligible activities provisions of the Act.52 HUD's interest in enforcing the
maintenance of effort provisions, however, must be skeptically viewed,
as CD application forms do not require information relating to prior
effort levels.
A strict and not unreasonable interpretation of the law would require
continued local funding for community development in an amount
equal to the prior matching share,53 or to local noncash credits54
provided for urban renewal, water and sewer, or other community
development programs. On the other hand, reduction of only the local
matching share may fail to constitute a "substantial" reduction. In any
event, a significant reduction in local share funding may present
litigation problems.5 5 The litigation approach to violations of this
maintenance of effort requirement was derived from the Senate bill, but the legislative
history is silent as to its breadth or limitations. S. REP. No. 693, supra note 32, at 48.
51. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372 (1973); Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
52.42 U.S.C. § 5305 (Supp. IV, 1974); 24C.F.R. §§ 570.200-01 (1975); Final HUD Reg. §§
570.200-01, 41 Fed. Reg. 2766-68 (1976). This position is also suggested in Fishman, supra
note 5, at 189, 205 n.4.
53. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1454, 1460 (1970). The Open Space Program required a local
share of one-half, id. § 1500a(a)(2), Neighborhood Facilities one-third, id. § 3 103(b), and
Water and Sewer one-half, id.§ 3102(b). Twenty percent of local project planning and
administrative funds were required under Model Cities. Id. §§ 3304(a), 3305(b), (c). This
position was taken by HUD with regard to previously committed urban renewal projects
in a memorandum of Oct. 10, 1975, reversing an earlier and weaker provision. See 3
HOUSING & DEv. REP. CURRENT DEv. 491 (1975); id. at 279(1975).
54. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1460(d), 1463 (1970); U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.,
Urban Renewal Handbook RHA 7216.1.
55. The issue has been raised in a suit in Dallas,Texas, where it is charged that the city is
using CD funds to replace current city spending on an on-going flood relocation project.
Bois D'Arc. Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filed July 23,
1975), reported in Community Dev. Digest, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1-2. See NAACP v. Hills, Civil
No. C-75-2257-WHO (N.D. Cal., Mar. 19, 1976).
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provision would be through the requirements section of the Secretarial
review provisions.5 6 Remedies would be limited to either requiring a
repayment of funds equal to the previous local commitment or
conditioning any funds on continued local commitment.
E. Civil Rights Considerations in the Planning
of Community Development Activities
Many issues concerning housing assistance plans and the availability
of lower-income housing opportunities will be addressed in later
sections. Although overlapping with the issue of housing availability,
civil rights issues which could conceivably be disclosed on the face of the
application will now be addressed. The potential fact situations are of
two types: affirmative, where discriminatory activities are planned; and
negative, where a discriminatory effect will result from the nonaction of
the applicant. This dichotomy is of limited value as affirmative action is
generally accompanied by the failure to mitigate incidental effects of a
program. An example of an affirmative action would be the proposed
clearance of an identifiable minority community to make way for an
industrial complex, convention or sports center, or even housing.57 The
negative aspect of that proposal will most often be the absence of a
meaningful plan for the minority community's relocation, either as a
group or individually.
Negative discrimination can occur if a community's application
systematically ignores development needs of identifiable minority-
dominated neighborhoods. An example of negative discrimination
would be a CD application addressing only the need for downtown
commercial renewal and ignoring residential needs of minorities and
the poor. This negative discrimination is made more dramatic if a
community has never sought federal funds for rehabilitation, renewal or
code enforcement activities in spite of a great need for housing
improvement, but has used urban renewal funds for commercial needs.
Such a program would eventually result in a high degree of
deterioration in those affected neighborhoods, the eventual "solution"
being abandonment or strict code enforcement, and orders to vacate,
56. See note 32 supra.
57. See, e.g., English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971); Arrington v.
City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp.
16 (E.D. Mich. 1971), plan approved, 357 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd in part, 503
F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974), further relief ordered to locate prior residents and plan
replacement housing, 394 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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possibly forcing an exodus of poor and minorities5 8 from the communi-
ty.
There are various litigation strategies available to deal with these
problems. First, there is the constitutional attack under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments that the affected persons are being denied equal
protection of the law.5 9 The equal protection clause would provide a
tool to avoid the most blatant examples of discrimination visited upon
racial minorities such as displacement into a deteriorated or nonexistent
housing supply. 60 Secondly, relief would also be available under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 61 Litigation under Title VI essentially
applies traditional equal protection tests and standards. 62 More
importantly, Title VI requires that the funding agency police its funded
program to assure the absence of discriminatory effects.63
58. The National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing has charged that
Bonner Springs, Kansas, has proposed construction and maintenance of a city-wide sewer
system serving the white areas of the community when only outdoor facilities are provided
in black areas. Similarly, it has charged Fort Smith, Kansas, of limiting code enforcement
activities to white areas of the community. Community Dev. Digest, Apr. 22, 1975, at 8.
Alternatively, under these alleged facts the equal protection clause could be utilized to
mandate an equalization of municipal services. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F. 2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), aff'd on motion for rehearing, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972). HUD has
characterized its own civil rights monitoring performance under the HCDA as "lax" and
"wholly inadequate." 3 HousiNG 8: D~v. REP. CURRENT DEV. 538 (1975)(remarks of James
H. Blair, Assistant Secretary for Equal Opportunity, HUD).
59. The fifth amendment would be invoked due to the presence of federal approval and
financial assistance. The equal protection standards of the fourteenth amendment would
be applied under the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). As against
the state or local defendants, litigation under the fourteenth amendment could be raised
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Jurisdiction would be provided by 28 U.S.C. §§
1343(3), (4) (1970). See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618(1969). Fifth amendment
claims may be raised by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), relating to federal questions. WhereZahn
v. International Paper, 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (precluding aggregation of claims to meet the
$10,000 jurisdiction minimum of § 1331) portends problems, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970)
(relating to mandamus actions), will provide a jurisdictional base to raise the
constitutional issue. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), provides a jurisdictional base to
cases arising under the 1964 Civil Rights Act due to its commerce power constitutional
base. See, e.g., Mandina v. Lynn, 357 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
60. See Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The
Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 187 (1975) (discussion of
some litigation approaches and an examination of fault as a factor).
61. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 12
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970). See Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
62. See, e.g., Ward v. Winstead, 314 F. Supp. 1225 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
63. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). A potentially significant facet
of the HCDA is its expanded coverage of Title VI to include sex discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §
[Vol. 11:37
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/3
TITLE I OF HCDA OF 1974
Thirdly, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 196864 provides an
additional base for attacking communities which hamper the availabili-
ty of housing.6 5 The Act requires federal programs to be administered
affirmatively to further increase housing opportunity. 66 In addition, it
should be noted that Title VIII was expanded by the HCDA to cover sex
discrimination. 67
Fourthly, section 111 of the HCDA establishes remedies or procedures
to be used where there is legal noncompliance. 68 This section permits
reduction and termination of benefits following a hearing from which
the recipient may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
circuit where the community is located. In addition to this statutory
provision HUD has promulgated regulations implementing the
nondiscrimination provisions describing certain prohibited dis-
criminatory actions. 69 Where prior discrimination has occurred or
where such effects have existed, the regulations call for affirmative
action to overcome the effects of such prior discrimination or practice.70
Fifthly, the Secretarial review portions of the Act provide additional
bases to question the application with regard to civil rights con-
siderations in planned activities. Where the community misrepresented
the nature and extent of need (e.g., failure to disclose the need for
residential treatment), the application may be "inconsistent" with
need.7' Likewise, where needs indicate residential priority and the
application fails to so provide, or where the application discloses a
5309 (Supp. IV, 1974) (administrative relief must follow a 60-day offer of an opportunity
for compliance to the Governor or chief administrative officer). See also 24 C.F.R. §§
570.601,. 912 (1975). The Act gives the Secretary discretion to refer the matter to the
Attorney General for suit, exercise Title VI powers, exercise noncompliance remedies
undcr the Act, or take other action autorized by law.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970).
65. See. e.g.. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd, 508 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (discriminatory land use regulation).
66. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3608(c), (d) (1970).
67. -12 U.S.C. § 5309 (Supp. IV, 1974). See note 63 supra.
68. 12 U.S C. § 5311 (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 570.913 (1975). In Knoxville
Progressive Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783,789 n.4 (E.D. Tenn. 1975),
the notion that this provision precluded citizen suits was rejected. See Bois D'Arc Patriots
v. City of Dallas. Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., Dec. 24, 1975).
69. 24 C.F.R. § 570.601 (1975).
70. Id. § 570.601(b)(4) (1975).
71. See generally notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
1976]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
critical housing shortage and a high degree of deterioration with the
community proposing a large amount for demolition and displacement,
the application may constitute "inappropriate" activities.12 Additional-
ly, where the nondiscrimination provisions are violated, the Secretarial
review section prohibits application approval in the absence of
compliance with requirements of the Act.
3
Sixthly, it is also conceivable that the certification for "maximum
feasible priority to activities which will benefit low- or moderate-income
families or aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight"
would be applicable under the present genre of programmatic
difficulties. 7 4 Besides not giving maximum feasible priority to such
needs, the problems represent a maximum feasible effort not to address
the needs of lower-income families. Seventhly, the strategy of requiring
an environmental impact statement under NEPA on the overall
application may provide a mechanism to examine and review a
program's discriminatory effects.7 5
Finally, where extensive displacement is programmed and the
available and planned housing resources will not adequately address the
needs of displacees, the needs generated by concurrent displacement
programs, and the dynamics of the local housing market,7" the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970 (URA)7 7 should provide an additional and perhaps more desirable
remedy. In the face of a long and well-documented history of abuses
visited upon persons subjected to the relocation process,78 Congress
72. See generally notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
73. See generally note 32 supra.
74. See generally notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
75. See generally notes 233-69 and accompanying text infra.
76. Much of this will be explored further under the sections relating to the application's
Housing Assistance Plan. See notes 114-182 and accompanying text infra.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601, 4602, 4621-38, 4651-55 (1970).
78. E.g., SELECT COMM. ON REAL PROPERTY AcQUISITION, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF
COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN
FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 106 (Comm. Print 1964); Hearings on H.R.
14898, H.R. 14899, S. 1 and Related Bills Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2dSess. (1969-70); Eichenberg, From Capital Hill:A Uniform Relocation Act:
The Price of Uniformity, 3 URBAN LAW. 480 (1971); Hartman, Relocation: Illusory
Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REv. 745 (1971); LeGates, supra note 4; Mandelker,
Model State Relocation Law, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 117; Note, The Interest of Rootedness:
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passed the URA to assure "fair and equitable treatment" for those
destined to suffer the burden of displacement. It is no surprise to learn
that the politically handicapped- the poor and minorities - constitute
the bulk of relocatees and, therefore, are the principal beneficiaries of the
URA.79
Those familiar with the urban landscape know that the sites of civic
"improvements," highways and other public works projects were once
the homes of the poor and minorities. To safeguard against the
wholesale removal of persons into even more deteriorated or nonexistent
urban housing markets the URA prohibits a federal or federally assisted
agency from relocating any person without first ensuring that suitable
replacement housing is available.80 The Act defines what constitutes
"suitable" replacement housing,8' grants the displacing agency
authority to build replacement housing itself in its so-called "Houser of
Last Resort" provision,8 2 grants certain financial benefits such as
79. In fiscal year 1973, HUD and the Federal Highway Administration displaced 162,078
persons, of whom 52,213 were black or Spanish surnamed. General Serv. Administration,
Executive Departments and Agencies Report on Implementation of the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970, at 000122, 332 (Feb. 7,
1974).
80. -12 U.S.C. § 4626(b) (1970), provides: "No person shall be required to move from his
dwelling on or afterJanuary 2, 1971, on account of any Federal project, unless the Federal
agency head is satisfied that replacement housing, in accordance with section 4625(c) (3) of
this title, is available to such person." For a general discussion of the requirements of
relocation planning see NATIONAL HOUSING AND ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJECT,
HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAW, ch. 10 Supp. (1973). See also 24 C.F.R. pt. 42 (1975) (HUD's
implementing regulations); U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., HUD Handbook,
Relocation Policies and Procedures 1371.1, Rev. Feb. 20, 1975; U.S. Dep't of Housing &
Urban Dev., Community Planning and Development Transmittal 1371.1 Rev. Chg. Aug.
26, 1975; U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Handbook, Evaluation of Relocation Plan
Housing Resources 4035.4, July, 1974.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4625(c)(3) (1970), provides that the displacing agency shall
assure that ... there will be available in areas not generally less desirable in regard
to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within
the financial means of the families and individuals displaced, decent, safe, and
sanitary dwellings, as defined by such Federal agency head, equal in number to the
number of and available to such displaced persons who require such dwellings and
reasonably accessible to their places of employment, except that the head of that
Federal agency may prescribe by regulation situations when such assurances may be
waived.
82. See id. § 4626(a): "If a Federal project cannot proceed to actual construction because
comparable replacement sale or rental housing is not available, and the head of the Federal
agency determines that such housing cannot otherwise be made available he may take such
action as is necessary or appropriate to provide such housing by use of funds authorized for
such project."
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moving expenses, renters' and owners' benefits,83 and requires that the
displacing agency make relocation services available.84 The Act is
enforced by prohibiting the federal funding source from approving any
program that will cause displacement unless the state or local agency has
filed assurances that replacement housing will be available. The
relocation provisions of URA have been held to be fully reviewable by
the courts.8 5
The HCDA is silent on the issue of URA applicability. It seems lear,
however, that URA coverage extends to the Act since the URA applies
when displacement occurs as a result of "Federal Financial Assistance,"
defined as a "grant, loan or contribution" provided by the United
States.8 6 This is apparently the view of HUD, as their regulations clearly
mandate the application of the URA to activities performed under the
Act.87
Relief available under the multifarious causes of action discussed
above would be broad and flexible. The equitable powers of the federal
judiciary in addressing equal protection violations are extensive.8 8
While the determination of the type of remedy is generally left to the
discretion of the district court, 9 that discretion can be abused, resulting
in a remand with directions to expand or contract the limits of the relief
83. The agency must reimburse reasonable movingexpenses and provide up toS4,000 to
enable the displacee to move into decent, safe and sanitary housing if he otherwise could
not afford it. Furthermore, homeowners may be granted an amount up to $15,000 to
facilitate a move to suitable replacement housing. Id. §§ 4622-24.
84. Id. § 4625.
85. Tullock v. State Highway Comm'n, 507 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1974); Jones v. District of
Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937
(1975); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Keith v.
California Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974). But cf. Seeherman v. Lynn, 404 F. Supp. 1318
(M.D. Pa. 1975). See also Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redev. v. HUD. 406 F.
Supp. 1024 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1970).
87. 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.303(e)(3), 602 (1975). See also id. pt. 42.1.
88. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). But see the
limitations on metropolitan relief raised in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 714 (1974), and
hopes for the future outlined in Kushner & Wemer, supra note 60. See also Note,
Developing Litigation Strategies for Multidistrict Relief: The Legal Implications of
Milliken v. Bradley on Metropolitan School Desegregation, 11 UURBAN L. ANN. 187(1976).
89. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 11:37
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/3
TITLE I OF HCDA OF 1976
so that the remedy more closely fits the violation.90
As the Title VI and HUD nondiscrimination provisions utilize equal
protection tests, their remedies can be considered jointly. Certainly
continuing to aid discriminatory activities would be unlawful.9 ' Thus a
clear remedy would be to deny all funds to the community or to strike
those activities contributing to the discrimination. Where the dis-
crimination relates to nonactivity, relief should either be a denial of all
HCDA funds or the conditioning of funds on the achievement of explicit
performance standards. Clearly, the court should enjoin all dis-
criminatory activities. Where prior proposals for low-income housing
were rejected on racial grounds, a number of remedies would exist.
Ideally a court might adopt a plan that would permit community
development to go forward but only with the guidance of performance
standards established under judicial supervision. Such a plan should
include the development of housing opportunities through application
for subsidies from HUD, the establishment of a local housing authority
if none exists, the timing of activities to assure compliance with the
plan, and a degree of equality for all program participants, but
primarily for the class which has suffered discrimination.92 Where it is
determined that the application presents an "inconsistent" description
of needs, all funds should be denied. This result should also follow
where the recipient's certification of aiding those of low- or moderate-
income or in preventing or eliminating slums is defective, or where the
planned activities are "inappropriate" to needs and discriminatory
activities cannot be carved out and eliminated. Thus, funds could be
denied where the application simply ignores needed treatment in
minority areas, or where discrimination results from affirmative
90. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), afj'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S.Ct. 1538 (1976); Garrett
%. City of Hambramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974); further relief ordered, 391 F.Supp.
1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
91. Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958);
Pennsylvania %,. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d
1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
92. Compare Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974),
aff'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S.Ct. 1538 (1976), and Garrett v. City of Hamtramck,
335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971, plan approved, 357 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd
in part, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974), further relief ordered, 391 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich.
1975), with Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151,336 A.2d 713(1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808(1975).See also Kushner, Land Use
Liftgation and Low-Income Housing: Mandating Regional Fair Share Plans, 9
CLEArI NGHOIOuE REv. 10 (1975) reprinted in amended form, in 27 ZONING DIGEsr No. 6, at
12 (1975); Kushner & Werner, supra note 60.
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activities directed at the minority community.
Where a NEPA remedy is imposed, preparation and review of an
environmental impact statement should occur before undertaking any
community development activities. 93 Where the provisions of the URA
are violated, relief should first be directed at enjoining all displacement
producing activities94 to permit adequate relocation needs assessment
and planning. Once a prepared relocation plan discloses the level of
need, either the project can proceed in the presence of suitable
safeguards95 or the "Houser of Last Resort" section could be utilized to
condition execution of planned activities on the recipient's provision of
sufficient new housing resources to accommodate all displacee needs.
F. Community Participation under HCDA at the Application Stage
The Act sets out in extremely general terms the citizen participation
requirements at the application stage. For an application to be approved
the community must provide:
satisfactory assurances that.., it has (A) provided citizens with
adequate information concerning the amount of funds available
for proposed community development and housing activities, the
range of activities that may be undertaken, and other important
program requirements, (B) held public hearings to obtain the view
of citizens on community development and housing needs, and (C)
provided citizens an adequate opportunity to participate in the
development of the application; but no part of this paragraph
shall be construed to restrict the responsibility and authority of the
applicant for the Community Development Program.9 6
HUD's implementing regulations specify that two hearings must be
held under subsection (B) 97 and further define the role of citizens vis-a-
vis decision making:
The citizen participation requirements of this paragraph do not
93. See generally notes 233-69 and accompanying text infra.
94. Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324
(C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nor. Keith v. California Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974); Golden
Dawn Shops, Inc. v. HUD, 333 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
95. See, e.g., Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974), further relief
ordered, 391 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
97. 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(e)(2)(ii) (1975).
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include concurrence by any person or group involved in the citizen
participation process in making final determinations concerning
the findings and contents of the application. The sole responsibili-
ty and authority to make such final determinations rests
exclusively with the applicant.9 8
The citizen participation application requirements present an
extremely vague measuring stick for litigation purposes. As the Act calls
for "citizen" participation, questions may arise regarding which
"citizens" must participate. Such an issue may arise where a recipient
designates a "blue ribbon" citizens advisory group, that excludes
minorities and the poor, to participate in planning and applications.
The legislative history discloses that "citizen" must include those
affected by proposed activities.99 In addition, questions of what
constitutes "adequate information" or an "adequate opportunity to
participate in the development of the application" can be raised along
with questions concerning the quality of any hearings held.
In many cases the community deals summarily with the certification
requirements by holding hearings before the city council prior to formal
adoption of the city's plan. 00 In Honolulu, two meetings were held. The
first apparently was by invitation to neighborhood associations, and the
second a public hearing.before the city council.' 0 More serious than the
question of notice is the implication by Honolulu officials that citizens
could not influence the choice of proposed projects. Preliminary to
98, Id. § 570.303(e)(2).
99. The House Bill modified "citizens" by the phrase "likely to be affected by proposed
community development and housing activities." H.R. 15361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §
104(a)(5)(A) (1974). The Senate version required the applicant to certify that it "has
provided for the meaningful involvement of the residents of areas in which community
development activities are to be concentrated." S. 3066,,93d Cong. 2d Sess. §§ 308(a)(3)(B),
(C) (1974). As there was no difference in the versions of the bill it may be argued that
"citizens" as contained in § 104(a)(6) of the Act includes both of the offered phrases.
Otherwise a change in the philosophy of the Conference Committee surely would have
been noted. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 26, at 300.
100. Citizens in Dallas, Texas, have attacked the failure to create any citizen advisory
groups for HCDA activities. Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D
(N.D. Tex., filed July 23, 1975), reported in Community Dev. Digest, Aug. 19,1975, at 1-2.
In Ulster County Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), the district court, dismissed the plaintiff's complaint that in partchallenged citizen
participation compliance, dealt summarily with the issue, and held that HUD's approval
was prima facie proof of compliance with the Act.
101. Mayor's Message No. 56 from Mayor Frank F. Fasi, Honolulu, Hawaii, to the City
Council, Feb. 3, 1975; letter from Robert P. Dye, Director, Office of Human Resources,
Honolulu, Hawaii, to local community leaders, Feb. 28, 1975.
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holding their public meetings, the Honolulu Office of Human
Resources wrote to community groups intimating that projects to be
undertaken were, in part, dictated by HUD.102 In other communities the
provisions were taken more seriously given citizen interest and
awareness in the OEO poverty program (CAP), and the history of model
cities and urban renewal. 10 3 Rarely, however, were citizens really made a
part of a development process; generally they had only the opportunity
to speak. Clearly, if the hearings are not held the Act is violated and the
Secretarial review provision relating to requirements would dictate that
the application is defective and that all funds should be denied.' 04 More
difficult questions arise where notice was either not timely or given at
the wrong place. In such circumstances it would still seem the Act was
violated and, in addition, that due process under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments might have been denied by the absence of a meaningful
opportunity to take part.105 In this regard problems may arise where the
community first makes its decisions concerning the application, next
holds nominal public hearings without disclosing its plan, and
subsequently issues its previously prepared application. While not a
technical violation of the Act, it seems to suffer the same due process
problems as well as running counter to the intent of the Act. 06
102. "Functionally, the projects are predominantly capital improvement projects and
were predicated to a large extent on the federal requirements as well as the city's overall
priorities." Letter from Robert P. Dye, Director, Office of Human Resources, Honolulu,
Hawaii, to local community leaders, Feb. 28, 1975.
103. Suit has been filed in Saginaw, Michigan, attacking the city's use of private
meetings to make selections to a citizen participation body designed to represent citizens
under the HCDA. The suit charged both state law violations and due process
infringement. Campbell v. Saginaw City Council, No. 75-01651-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct,
Saginaw County, filed July 1, 1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 342. (1975).
104. See generally note 32 supra.
105. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1966); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co..
339 U.S. 306 (1950). But see Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968). In Edison, New Jersey, suit was filed by the
State Department of the Public Advocate charging improper advertisement of hearings
and the failure to encourage or consider meaningful citizen input. NAACP v. Hills, Civil
No. 75-1461 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 22, 1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 422 (1975).
This suit was subsequently settled with an agreement for improved citizen participation
procedures. 3 HOUSING & DEy. REP. CURRENT DEv. 865 (1976). See note 273 infra.
106. See Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Brinegar, Civil No. 72-64 (D. Ore., May 24,
1974), reported in 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 202, 203 (1974) (new hearings ordered based on
Department of Transportation's more specific hearing requirements where committed to
highway location at time of hearing). This issue was raised in Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of
Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filedJuly 23,1975), reported in Community Dev.
Digest, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1-2.
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Obviously, citizens cannot compel a veto power. Successful litigation on
this matter, however, may well result in stricter standards for citizen
involvement and a more stringent definition of "adequate" in terms of
the level of participation expected. 0 7 Certainly citizens should be
advised and consulted on planned activities. The potential for litigation
is great in this area considering the experience and expectations of
citizen groups with participation under other federal programs, the lack
of sophistication needed to identify the problem, and HUD's rejection of
suggestions for greater detail regarding the procedures, process and local
structure for citizen participation.'0 8
Should these litigation strategies not result in improved citizen
participation, there still remains access to decisionmaking via regional
A-95 review requirements.'0 The A-95 mechanism requires state and
local review of federal projects." 0 Of course, the failure to comply with
A-95 review requirements constitutes a requirement violation and could
result in nonapproval by HUD or a denial of program funds."'
Making matters extremely confused, HUD has promulgated perfor-
mance standards for citizen participation that contain more substantive
requirements regarding the formation of advisory groups at the city-
wide and local level." 2 HUD has ruled that these requirements must be
107. Cf. North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970),
dismissed on remand, 329 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 456 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 106 U.S. 963 (1972) (Model Cities citizen participation).
108. "Such comments were given careful consideration and rejected since the proposed
requirements would have imposed upon HUD the responsibility for specifying the
manner in which local general purpose government related to its citizens. This role was
not considered appropriate for HUD." 39 Fed. Reg. 40,136 (1974).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(e) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(e)(6) (1975). Circular A-95
is based upon Subchapter II of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-39 (1970). A revised circular is published at4 I Fed. Reg. 2052
(Jan. 13, 1976).
110. See generally Morganthaler, OMB Circular A-95: A Neglected Environmental
.ssessment Tool Provides an Early Public Pressure Point, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP.
50013 (1974); Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegregation Versus Public Housing
Desegregation: The Local School District and the Metropolitan Housing District, 10
URBAN L. ANN. 145, 156-64 (1975); Salsich, supra note 10, at 319-23. See also notes 126-29
and accompanying text infra. HUD recognizes that regional review has often been
meaningless in the past as has been HUD's review of the process under its § 701 planning
program. See 40 U.S.C. § 461 (Supp. IV, 1974); 3 HOUSING & DEV. REP. CURRENT DEv. 401
(1975). For a hopeful expectation of improvement under HCDA seeSalsich supra, note 10.
I 11. See generally notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
112. 23 C.F.R. § 570.900(d) (1975); Final HUD Reg. § 570.900(d), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,711
(1975). See notes 199-208 infra.
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complied with to sustain the applicant's initial application certification
on citizen participation. 13
III. HOUSING ASSISTANCE PLANS
To assist in understanding the concept of the Housing Assistance
Plan (HAP) it will be helpful to be familiar with the statutory language:
No grant may be made... unless an application shall have been
submitted to the Secretary in which the applicant-. .. (4) submits a
housing assistance plan which-
(A) accurately surveys the condition of the housing stock in the
community and assesses the housing assistance needs of lower-
income persons (including elderly and handicapped persons, large
families, and persons displaced or to be displaced) residing in or
expected to reside in the community,
(B) specifies a realistic annual goal for the number of dwelling
units or persons to be assisted including (i) the relative proportion
of new, rehabilitated, and existing dwelling units, and(ii) the sizes
and types of housing projects and assistance best suited to the needs
of lower-income persons in the community, and
(C) indicates the general locations of proposed housing for
lower-income persons, with the objective of (i) furthering the
revitalization of the community, including the restoration and
rehabilitation of stable neighborhoods to the maximum extent
possible, (ii) promoting greater choice of housing opportunities
and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted persons in areas
containing a high proportion of low income persons, and (iii)
assuring the availability of public facilities and services adequate
to serve proposed housing projects." 4
The HAP can be an extremely important document for a number of
reasons. It can be used in the context of both an inner-city and an outer-
city strategy to expand lower-income housing opportunities. The outer-
city strategy may take the form of assuring that CD recipients in
metropolitan areas surrounding central cities program and achieve a
level of production to meet the needs of the region in terms of growth
projections and the need for migration by the poor and minorities from
inner-cities to gain access to job opportunities, improved housing and
better living environments. This is particularly true in view of the reality
that the central cities are incapable of adequately addressing their
residents' housing needs. In this latter regard, the central city HAP
113. See note 206 and accompanying text infra.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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should provide dramatic evidence of the need for regional solutions to
this nation's housing crisis." 5
On the other hand, the inner-city HAP may provide the strategy to
question displacement proposals and to flex some muscle to press for
certain community development programs relating to housing needs.
For instance, if the central city has realistically planned minimal
housing construction but expects a sizeable degree of demolition and
displacement, the HAP can be used to force a major commitment to
rehabilitation activities and perhaps a lesser degree of displacement.
Some of these strategies will be brought out in the following sections.
Significant noncompliance and the response of litigation may be
anticipated with HAPs as even HUD recognizes that review has been
almost meaningless." 6
A. Identification of Need
The Act requires that the application contain a HAP that "accurately
surveys the condition of the housing stock in the community and
assesses the housing assistance needs of lower-income persons (in-
cluding elderly and handicapped persons, large families, and persons
displaced or to be displaced) residing in .or expected to reside in the
community." 1 7 Where a recipient is proposing displacement, the extent
of displacement must be indicated. The failure to indicate the housing
demand generated by displacement presents the easiest fact pattern upon
which to challenge a HAP." 8 The more difficult issues relate to housing
needs as shown by a survey of housing conditions or by suburban
115. See the discussion of City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp 889 (D. Conn., 1976), at
notes 120-24 infra.The importance of the HAP is underscored by the reliance of the
Supreme Court on its requirements in unanimously affirming the potential for
metropolitan-wide relief in the face of HUD funded housing discrimination. See Hills v.
Gautreaux. 96 S.Ct. 1538, 1549-50 & n.21 (1976).
116. 3 HOUSING & DEv. REP. CURRENT DEV. 401 (1975). James H. Blair, HUD'sAssistant
Secretary for Equal Opportunity, believes complaints and legal challenges against HUD
by civil rights groups over white suburbs' housing assistance plans have generally been
valid and correct. Id. at 538 (1975). It has been reported that HUD's approval of HAP s is
automatic even in the face of negative comments from regional planning agencies and
from branches of HUD itself. Potomac Institute, Inc., The Housing Assistance Plan: A
Non-Working Program for Community Improvement? (Nov. 1975).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
118. In Dallas, Texas, citizens claim the HAP fails to indicate displacement which will
result from planned code enforcement and demolition. Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of
Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filedJuly 23,1975), reported in Community Dev.
Digest, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1-2.
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communities' attempts to anticipate the future needs of those "expected
to reside" in the community. I" 9
The failure to accurately identify existing housing conditions
presents a difficult issue of proof in litigation. Communities often lack
meaningful data on existing housing conditions. The census no longer
lists substandard dwellings but instead is limited to compilations
concerning overcrowding and the absence of plumbing facilities. To
make matters worse, older cities, aware of the nearly insurmountable
problems of housing conditions, may be motivated to allocate CD funds
to pet civic projects rather than make the mammoth commitment to
housing preservation and rehabilitation that would be generated by a
realistic picture of housing needs in their HAP. The most dramatic test
of the HAP requirement as it relates to suburban recipients is presented
in City of Hartford v. Hills.12° In Hartford a federal court permanently
enjoined the suburban towns around Hartford, Connecticut, t2' from
making HCDA expenditures because the towns failed to prepare HAPs
which adequately addressed regional and local housing needs.
Hartford's significance lies not only in the fact that the central city was
pitted as the challenger, but is additionally noteworthy because of
HUD's role in the matter; legal complications for HUD grew out of the
approval of the suburban applications over the equal opportunity field
staff's recommended disapproval,122
Judge Blumenfeld's decision, emphatically demanding strict com-
pliance with the Act to accomplish the goals and purposes established by
Congress, stands as a landmark in the early interpretation of the new
community development law. Finding that "the 'expected to reside'
figure is the keystone of the spatial deconcentration objective of the 1974
Act," the court held that HUD approval of HAPs in six of the suburban
119. Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(c)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. 7504 (1976).
120. 408 F.Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
121. Id. The communities include Farmington, Windsor Locks, Vernon, Enfield, East
Hartford, West Hartford and Glastonbury. So far the only response by the local defendants
to the lawsuit has been the call by one suburban selectman for an economic boycott of the
City of Hartford. 3 HOUSING & DEV. REP. CURRENT DEv. 361 (1975).
122. The court found that HUD had, by internal memorandum, waived the "expected to
reside" HAP requirement as a prerequisite to first year approval and that such waiver was
national in scope. 408 F. Supp. at 899-900 (D. Conn. 1976). HUD's Assistant Secretary for
Equal Opportunity points to Hartford as a case where HUD's civil rights monitoring was
"lax" and "wholly inadequate." 3 HOUSING & DEv. REP. CURRENT DEv. 538 (1975). Also
cited was the Detroit area complaint filed by the National Committee Against




TITLE I OF HCDA OF 1974
communities containing "expected to reside" figures of zero was
contrary to law."2 3 The City of East Hartford based its "expected to
reside" figure of 135 units upon projections from the public housing
authority's waiting list, a figure and methodology that HUD admitted
to be unsatisfactory. The court declared this HAP to be "plainly
inconsistent" with "generally available" information. 2 The Hartford
decision is important in that it stands for the principle of strict
compliance and close judicial scrutiny of HCDA requirements, and will
no doubt encourage aggressive implementation and HUD review of the
law's requirements as well as a heightened interest for citizen and central
city monitoring of HCDA performance. Finding the central city a
plaintiff against the exclusionary suburbs is novel, yet the motivation is
provided by the HCDA which allows funds denied to a recipient to be
reprogrammed to other localities in the state with first priority to "any
metropolitan area in the same state.' 25
Several administrative complaints have been filed with HUD
attacking suburban HAPs. A petition has been filed seeking to have
funds for Burlington County, New Jersey, withheld pending adoption
of a county low-income HAP and the elimination of exclusionary
zoning. 26 Burlington County contains the Township of Mount Laurel
123. 408 F. Supp. at 901-02. One purpose of the Act is to lessen "the isolation of income
groups within communities and geographical areas and to promote an increase in the
diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing
opportunities for persons of lower income ... " 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
The cities included all of those listed in note 121 supra, with the exception of East
Hartford.
124. 408 F. Supp. at 906. The court suggested that the city could have consulted the data
sources listed in HUD's regulations in 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2)(i)(A) (1975), or such
sources as" studies conducted by or for state agencies; plant or shopping center surveys; zip
code information from the payroll records of local companies; or data gathered by the local
chamber of commerce." 408 F. Supp. at 905. Moreover, the public housing waiting list
would not reflect those in the lower income range with incomes in excess of the public
housing admission maximum. Id. at 906. The court also noted that HUD required an
amendment of the original HAP which, while raising the existing need figures for the city,
lowered the figure for "expected to reside." Id. HUD's regulations require "estimates of the
number of lower income families with workers expected to be employed in the community
in the next three years as a result of known commercial, industrial, government, or service
employment to be generated by new or expanded development .... Sources of information
may include approved development plans, building permits, and awards of significant
contracts." Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(c)(2)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 7505, 11,128 (1976).
125. -12 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. IV, 1974). HUD's regulations give first priority for such
funds "to the same metropolitan area." Final HUD Reg. § 570.409(f)(1)(i), 40 Fed. Reg.
,12.318 (1975). See note 136 infra.
126. In re Lawrence (filed Mar. 25, 1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 52 (1975).
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and the petition seeks an implementation of both the decision in
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 27
and the adoption of a county-wide plan to achieve the regional
allocation plan goals. The Burlington application indicates a lower-
income housing need of 10,000 units despite the fact that the regional
allocation for the county sets the need at more than 92,000 of which
approximately 23,000 would be for persons with yearly incomes below
$10,000. The Regional Planning Commission passed a resolution
conditioning HCDA application approval on the inclusion of a HAP
which conforms to the regional housing allocation system. 28 HUD has
ruled that it will not approve applications unless they comply with the
Act and other applicable laws, which includes orders of state and federal
courts. 2 9 Thus, successful housing and land use litigation resulting in
affirmative orders to build or supply housing units must be included in a
HAP and complied with for HCDA approval.
Another administrative complaint has been filed against twenty-six
suburbs in the Detroit metropolitan area. This complaint not only
challenges the failure of HAPs to properly consider the needs of
nonresident workers, but also assails the HAPs reliance on existing units
to utilize Section 8 subsidies despite the presence of extremely low
vacancy rates.130 Finally, the National Committee Against Discrimina-
tion in Housing has charged that Parma, Ohio, has failed to identify the
lower-income housing needs generated from the Cleveland metro-
politan area, citing as evidence the huge public housing waiting lists.'3'
In reviewing HAPs, just as in the CD activities review, the Secretary is
limited to data generally available in the community to determine
whether the HAP is consistent with a community's need. 32 Thus it is
127.67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (ordering that in the
face of a constitutional violation based on exclusionary land use practices, communities
may not foreclose the opportunity for lower-income housing and must affirmatively
afford such opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need therefore). See Kushner, sulira note 92. Accord, Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d672(1975);Township of
Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - Pa. - , 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
128. In re Lawrence (filed Mar. 25, 1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 52 (1975).
129. Community Dev. Digest, June 3, 1975, at 3.
130. Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD, reported in 2 HOUSING & DEV. REP.
1245 (May 5, 1975). The complaint has been rejected by HUD but a lawsuit is being
prepared. 3 HOUSING & D~v. REP. CURRENT DEv. 538 (Nov. 3, 1975).
131. Potomac Institute, Memorandum 75-4, Apr. 24, 1975.
132. See notes 25-30 andaccompanying text supra. HUD's regulations approved in early
1976, pose the possibility of exhaustion of claims by HUD and HCDA recipients in
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essential to compare the HAP needs analysis with older studies, census
information, previous Workable Program applications and urban
renewal analyses. If a community has misrepresented housing con-
ditions in its HAP and HUD has approved the application, the only
remedy would appear to be a denial of all funds on the basis of the
inconsistency between the application and their data. In light of the
above discussion, the needs description will also have a significant effect
on the proposed CD activities, as the failure to address or draw plans to
meet the stated needs might dictate a reordering of CD priorities to
relieve the housing needs situation.
The outer-city strategy with regard to the HAP needs analysis may
well prove to be the most dramatic effect of the HCDA. The Act specifies
that an applicant must plan, not only for its present residents, but for
those "expected to reside in the community." The HUD regulations
expand this notion to cover those either "already residing in the
community, or planning or expected to reside in the community as a
result of planned or existing employment facilities." 133 Taking this
discussion one step further, a community must also recognize in its HAP
a need equal to at least its "fair share" of the regional low-income
housing need.' 3' Therefore, any regional low-income housing alloca-
requiring submissions by citizens wishing to challenge HAPs.The challenges must set
forth the identity and location of documents relied upon (citing pages and the specific
HAP deficiency it relates to) and must be filed within 15 days after the applicant publishes
that the application has been accepted by HUD for processing. Final HUD Reg. §
570.300(c), 41 Fed. Reg. 7503, 7504 (1976). The failure to utilize a regional allocation plan
may prompt a finding of inconsistency with regional plans and thus inconsistency under
the HCDA. This position is also taken in Franklin, Open Communities Litigation and the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, in NATIONAL CoMM~i. AGAtNsT
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE LITIGATION, POLICY AND STRATEGY
FOR THE FUTURE 83, 101 (1975); Salsich, supra note 10 at 323.
Unfortunately, HUD is reported to have often approved HAPs despite negative A-95 and
regional planning comments. Potomac Institute, Inc., The Housing Assistance Plan: A
Non-Working Program for Community Improvement? (Nov. 1975).
133. Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(c)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. 7504-05, 11,128-29 (1976). Authority
for this position is found in the House Report which states:
The Committee wishes to emphasize that the bill requires communities, in
assessing their housing needs o look beyond the needs of their residents to those
who can be expected to reside in the community as well. Clearly, those already
employed in the community can be expected to reside there. Normally, estimates of
those expected to reside in a particular community would be based on employment
data generally available to the community and to HUD. However, in many cases,
communities should be able to take into account planned employment facilities as
well, and their housing assistance plans should reflect the additional housing needs
that will result.
H.R. REP. No. 1114, supra note 26 at 7.
134. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151,336A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 8081975). See generally M. BRooKs.
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tion plans prepared by the regional planning agency should be
examined for consistency with studies of industrial and commercial
growth potential and the community's economic base. 3 5 Studies
indicating the residences of persons presently employed in the
community would also be relevant. Certainly the existence of a
mechanism conditioning federal grants upon a proper recognition of
low-income housing needs is a significant step toward achieving
meaningful housing opportunities.
It may be advisable for housing-oriented groups to monitor all HAPs
in a metropolitan area to determine if they are consistent with regional
"fair share" allocation plans and with studies on the number of workers
currently employed or expected to be employed in each community. To
achieve a regional result, it may be necessary to include numerous
communities in litigation. 36
LOWER INCOME HOUSING: THE PLANNERS' RESPONSE (ASPO Planning Advisory Serv. Rep.
No. 282, 1972); H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 10; Kushner, supra note 92;
Listokin, Fair Share Housing Distribution: Will It Open the Suburbs to Apartment
Development?, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 739 (1974).
135. HUD allows communities to utilize regional fair share allocations in place of
computations of those "expected to reside." Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(c)(2)(ii), 41 Fed.
Reg. 7505 (1976).
136. This is obviously the direction being taken in Detroit and Hartford. See notes 120-24
and 130 and accompanying text supra. Efforts along these lines should be facilitated by the
liberal standing requirements found in Mount Laurel. See Kushner, supra note 92, at 14.
The Supreme Court's recent restrictive interpretation of standing in exclusionary land use
litigation cases must be anticipated. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Note,
Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning
Scheme, II URBAN L. ANN. 223 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Potential Resident
Challenger]. However, the Court recognized the possibility of congressionally established
standing. The HCDA certainly contains a broad definition of the zone of interest in the
field of community development. Moreover, the congressional findings set the stage for
judicial recognition of the rather sophisticated injuries in fact which can exist in this area.
See Franklin, supra note 132, at 90-98; Kushner& Werner, supra note 60, at 187 n.107. Herb
Franklin, based upon the clear statutory directive in the HCDA to discourage
concentration of lower-income and minority persons and for suburban HAPs to address
the housing needs of their residents, employees and those who will be employed and might
be expected to reside, has stated his definition of injury in fact:
[A] central city resident holding or desiring a suburban job is more likely to be
injured in fact and is within the zone of interest established by the statute, to
complain of CD funding to a locality that has submitted an inadequate housing
assistance plan or has failed to implement its plan. The failure of the locality to
comply with the statute means that whatever opportunity such a plaintiff may have
to better his housing situation is being frustrated. He then has a direct stake in
HUD's implementation of the statute even though there is no assurance that a cut-
off of funds will stimulate the housing. The statutory scheme assumes that a threat
to cut off the funds will stimulate the housing, and this threat is not credible unless
the statute is enforced.
Franklin, supra note 132, at 94-95.
The HCDA should also provide cities and other governmental units with an adequate
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Another potential method available to assure that HAPs reflect true
community needs would be a suit under NEPA to require the
preparation of an environmental impact statement on the overall
application. 37 Certainly the housing needs of the community must be
examined to determine any impacts from proposed activities. An
insufficient needs component in the HAP could lead to overcrowding,
rent inflation, difficult or nonexistent access to jobs, and in general, a
situation with manifest blighting potential either within the communi-
ty or in the areas where persons in need of housing would be restricted
and concentrated.
base of standing. Cf. City of Davisv. Coleman, 521 F.2d661 (9thCir. 1975); Comment, The
Ninth Circuit Relaxes NEPA Standing in the Highway-Triggered Private Development
Context, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10191 (1975). The city's standing argument is bolstered
by the HCDA provision that where an application within a metropolitan area is not
approved, those funds will be reprogrammed to other localities in that state, with any
metropolitan area in the same state entitled to first priority. 42 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. IV,
1974). HUD's regulations go further and give first priority "to the same metropolitan
area." Final HUD Reg. § 570.409(f)(1)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 42,348 (1975).
In City of Hartford v. Hill, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), the court found that the
findings and purpose of the HCDA together with the urban condition of Hartford clearly
placed the city within the zone of interests of the legislation. Injury in fact was premised on
the statutory provision for a reallocation of funds to metropolitan areas in the same state
where funds are denied to specific recipients (42 U.S.C. § 5306(e) (Supp. IV, 1974)), and
on HUD's regulations that give first priority on such funds "to the same metropolitan
area." Final HUD Reg. § 570.409(f)(1)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 42,348 (1975). Regarding the two
low-income minority plaintiffs, the court held they are "certainly" in the zone of interests
created by the HCDA, citing the preamble material. 408 F. Supp. at 895. In addition the
court cited the federal civil rights acts as entitling them to protection. Id. Distinguishing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the court found that the plaintiffsare likely to benefit
from the possible reallocation of denied funds. 408 F. Supp. at 896-97. The Hartford court,
however, denied standing to individual city officials as their alleged inability to perform
their official duties failed to constitute a cognizable legal interest. Id. at 895.
As to standing to challenge other aspects of the HCDA, Knoxville Progressive Christian
Coalition v. Testennan, 404 F. Supp. 783, 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), recognized that if
standing were denied to the community's residents "it would be difficult to imagine any
low- or middle-income plaintiff with standing to challenge alleged improper allocation of
funds under the Community Development Act." Standing was found in Bois D'Arc
Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., Dec. 24, 1975), because the
HCDA does not preclude citizen review, and because plaintiffs' alleged injury was covered
by the legislation's zone of interest. The court cited such asserted environmental injuries as
"increased evictions ... increased housing costs, increased rodent, pest, and trash
problems, increased racial segregation, increased problems dealing generally with the
quality of life and other aesthetic considerations, and the deprivation of information and
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the decisions affecting the plaintiff
residents' environmental milieu." Id. Slip Opinion 6.
137. See generally notes 233-69 and accompanying text infra.
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B. Relation of Planned Housing Production to Need
Once the housing needs are adequately set out in the HAP the
application must:
[Specify] a realistic annual goal for the number of dwelling units
or persons to be assisted, including (i) the relative proportion of
new, rehabilitated, and existing dwelling units, and (ii) the sizes
and types of housing projects and assistance best suited to the needs
of lower-income persons in the community .... 138
Congressional housing goals need not be quixotic if either HUD or the
judiciary would make an aggressive attempt to require a comprehensive
and carefully conceived HAP. Ideally, HUD should utilize HAPs from
program year one to allocate subsidies for succeeding years.
Unfortunately, although such a system is logical, it may have adverse
effects in those communities allowed to produce insufficient HAPs. For
example, a suburban community interested in avoiding its "fair share"
of low-income housing could underestimate need and thus assure that a
diminished supply of subsidies would flow into the area. Consequently,
those communities committed to the goals of HCDA, and in tune with
the needs of the region's poor, will assume a disproportionate share of
the lower-income housing burden, and thereby increase the potential for
a concentration of such housing. 139 Likewise, inner-cities intent on
ignoring housing needs could effectively curb the amount of available
subsidies. Alternatively, a relatively realistic nationwide HAP perfor-
mance would provide a dramatic picture of this nation's housing crisis
with the potential result that vastly expanded subsidies would be funded
by Congress.
Once the HAP adequately defines housing conditions and needs,
several defects can be expected. 40 Communities may simply set goals at
unrealistically low levels conforming to political aspirations rather
than to housing need.' 4' This response may take several forms, in-
138.42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974); Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(c)(3), 41 Fed.
Reg. 7505-06 (1976). The application then requires the identification of locations. See
notes 174-82 and accompanying text infra. The House bill that authored the HAP
requirement had envisioned that local housing resources would, in large part, dictate how
subsidies would be allocated. H.R. REP. No. 1114, supra note 26, at 7.
139. HUD's provisional report on the status of the HCDA indicates that the average
HAP submitted sets the time for goal achievement at 13.3 years. Housing & Urban Affairs
Daily, May 13, 1975.
140. Separate discussion will be made of civil rights issues and economic exclusion.
141. HUD has disapproved the HCDA application forParma, Ohio, as the HAP showed
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cluding minimal housing production in the face of planned contrac-
tion of the supply by demolition and displacement, the programming of
only subsidized housing for the elderly in the face of glaring family
needs, 4 2 or the total absence of any goals.143
Several means exist to affect the HAP and its statement of goals. First,
it is possible to use the "appropriateness" provision of the Secretarial
review section to measure the adequacy of the HAP.1 4 4 While the Act
speaks only of setting goals, HUD regulations specify that goals must be
consistent with the description of needs.1 45 Where excessive contraction
of the housing supply is planned in the absence of sufficient planned
subsidized replacement units, the entire application, both in terms of
an unmet need for housing assistance for 1537 households and an annual goal of zero in the
face of 120 available assisted units. 3 HOUSING & DEV. REP. CURRENT D~v. 69 (1975). See
discussion of Hartford, notes 120-24 and accompanying text supra.
142. HUD has recognized the potential for this abuse and has promulgated regulations
designed to eliminate its effects. The regulations require, for example, that where a
community's three-year goal includes 25% of units for the elderly, that no less than that
percentage of available assistance could be used for elderly housing each year, allowing
10% ranges of deviation from goals. For instance, if 50% of the need is for families, HUD
will allow a goal of 40% with exceptions for special circumstances. Final HUD Reg. §
570.303(c)(3)(iv), 41 Fed. Reg. 7505 (1976).
1-13. In this last category, Corona, California, presents the most dramatic example. Its
HAP discloses the need for 600 units of housing for present residents and the existence of
248 substandard housing units, of which 122 are considered suitable for rehabilitation. Yet
the plan sets no goals for housing and simply states that "the three year goals are not yet
identified." HUD, Application for Federal Assistance, Community Development Block
Grant Program, Corona, Cal., Apr., 1975. Columbia, South Carolina, is, in part,
programming some 325 low-income housing units for which it possesses HUD
commitments to meet the needs of proposed displacement. HUD, Application for Federal
Assistance, Community Development Block Grant Program, Columbia, S.C., Mar., 1975.
It is alleged, however, that these commitments reflect "Houser of Last Resort" funds
intended tor displacees of an earlier urban renewal project. Comments of Midlands
Welfare Rights Organization to the Central Midlands Regional Planning Council, Mar.
21, 1975. To make matters worse, all Section 8 funds are programmed for elderly housing
despite a current need in family housing for nearly 5,000 units with public housing
waiting lists exceeding 2,000. Id. The city of Midlands, Texas, was advised of a possible
turndown by HUD of its HCDA application for failing to apply for Section 8 subsidies and
for failure to address family as well as elderly needs. 3 HOUSING 9- DEV. REP. CURRENT DEV.
70 (1975). Bloomfield, New Jersey, has also been so notified. Id. at 113. To demonstrate an
even clearer inconsistency, the city of Columbia, South Carolina, proposes to rehabilitate
275 units through its CD activities in the first year. However, assistance is limited to owner-
occupied houses for which the application cites only 241 such units that are substandard
and suitable for rehabilitation. The inconsistency is more serious considering that the
poor and minorities of Columbia live predominantly in rental housing that will not be
assisted. Comments of Midlands Welfare Rights Organization to the Central Midlands
Regional Planning Council, Mar. 21, 1975.
14 1. See generally notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
145. Final HUD Reg. § 570.303(c)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. 7504-05, 11,128-29 (1976).
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proposed CD activities and the HAP, may be "inappropriate."
Likewise, the failure to program family housing in the face of great need
may produce a finding of "inappropriateness." This is especially so in
light of a recent national trend to utilize public housing funds almost
exclusively for noncontroversial projects for the elderly. Were this defect
noted prior to the completion of the HUD application review, the HAP
might be amended or the CD activities realigned toward the utilization
and rehabilitation of existing housing; an especially desirable strategy
in light of lead time essential to utilize subsidies or to construct new
housing. After the application is approved, the appropriate remedy
would be a denial of funds.
From a litigation standpoint, the inner-city strategy should be to
encourage a strong commitment to subsidizing housing rehabilitation
and to the extent possible, seeking new construction and additional
subsidies. The outer-city strategy generally should be construction-
oriented or at least directed at utilizing leased housing under section 8116
to make existing market rate units available to those with housing needs.
A most effective strategy would look to the regional effort and the use of
a single lawsuit to compel the establishment of meaningful goals. In
addition, utilization of a NEPA over-all application environmental
impact statement would be most appropriate to the study of an over-all
housing development plan in measuring the adequacy of the com-
munity's goals, the various subsidy and community development
activity alternatives and their ability to most effectively meet the
described housing needs.14 7
Where proposed community development activities would result in
displacement and a HAP fails to expand the existing housing supply
even though there is a high level of need, the URA148 should be utilized
to require the execution of a relocation plan. Where insufficient
resources are disclosed by such a plan, the appropriate remedy would be
either to develop housing as a "last resort" or to cut down proposed
displacement activities. 4 9
Another route for testing a HAP would be to challenge the A-95 review
in light of an inconsistency with any regional "fair-share" allocation
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (1970). See generally Bishop, Assisted Housing Under the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 672 (1975).
147. See generally notes 233-69 and accompanying text infra.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1970).
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plan.150 However, the Act requires only the submission of the
application to the A-95 reviewing agency for "review and comment." 51
The HUD regulations merely require that the applicant explain any
inconsistencies with area-wide plans. 52 While the wording of the
HCDA may make it difficult to litigate whether there has been proper
comment on inconsistencies with area-wide plans, HUD's approval of
an application containing glaring inconsistencies may make a case for
"inappropriateness" under the Secretarial review section.153
While the issue of restrictive land use regulations and their effect on
HAPs will be taken up next, it is worth noting that recent developments
in exclusionary land use litigation present a means for mandating both
local approval and affirmative action in the implementation of the
regional "fair share" of low-income housing needs. 54 One form of such
relief, that could be based on federal or state constitutional notions of
equal protection and due process,15 5 would be to mandate the
preparation of an adequate HAP or even to mandate the preparation of
an application under the HCDA.
C. Housing Assistance Plans in the Environment
of Restrictive Land Use Practices
At this point we must presuppose a facially adequate HAP and an
otherwise adequate community development application. The problem
may then be that the applicant, under existing restrictive land use laws,
regulations or practices cannot carry out the HAP goals. These
restrictions may take several forms including exclusionary zoning
through the use of large lot requirements or density limits,5 6 building
150. See generally
, 
notes 109-11, 132 and accompanying text supra.
151. 12 U.S.C. § 5304(e) (Supp. IV 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(e)(6) (1975). See also notes
120-24 and accompanying text supra.
152. 21 C.F.R. § 570.303(a) (1975).
153. Se, notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
151. For a discussion of the Mount Laurel decision see note 127 and accompanying text
Mupra. Sec Note, The Potential Resident Challenger, supra note 136, at 251.
155. Where issues of race are involved, the United States Constitution may provide a
remedy.
156. Se, ,enerallv U.S. CONMt'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,TWENTY YEARS ArER BROWN: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUsING 109-18 (1975); Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary
Zoninq: The Second Generation Cases and the Environment, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 88 (1974);
Aloi & Goldberg, Racial "- Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the End?,
1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9; Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary
Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971); Freilich & Bass, Exclusionary Zoning:
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restrictions in the form of minimum floor space, maximum limits on
bedroom configurations and height limitations, and subdivision
regulation in the form of set-backs or mandatory set asides for such
amenities as open space, parking or public facilities. Other restrictive
techniques include growth limitations linked to maximum annual
starts, 5 7 timed sequential growth programs,'58 or regulations linking
construction to the availability of supporting municipal services or
schools. For example, an administrative complaint has been filed
against Burlington County, New Jersey, for its failure to eliminate
exclusionary zoning before seeking HCDA funds. 59 A similar attack has
been made on the Parma,,Ohio, application that HUD disapproved as
inappropriate with existing housing needs. 60
As the HCDA calls for a "realistic" description of annual goals, it
might be argued that a HAP describing programmed low-income
housing in the face of insurmountable legal obstacles is not "realistic."
Such a syllogistic approach would permit either HUD or a litigant to
utilize the Secretarial review provisions dealing with the need for
compliance with the "requirements" of the Act.t6' Should HUD utilize
this approach, it could result in either a denial or conditioning of funds
on the elimination of such practices prior to the approval of the
Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 URBAN LAW. 344 (1971); Sager, Tight Little Islands:
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969);
Note, The Potential Resident Challenger, supra note 136.
157. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
158. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1973); Freilich & Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential
Controls - The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New
Directions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis - St. Paul Metropolitan Region, 58
MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1974).
159. 2 HOUSING & DEV. REP. CURRENT DEV. 1138-39 (1975); Potomac Institute,
Memorandum 75-4, Apr. 24, 1975 (reporting In re Lawrence (filed Mar. 25, 1975)). The
complaint was filed both with HUD and the regional planning commission. The
commission passed a resolution that it would approve no HCDA applications in the
absence of local approval of a housing allocation plan in conformance with that of the
region. 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 52 (1975). Suit has also been filed to enjoin HCDA funds
from going to Willistown Township which was found by the Pennsylvania supreme court
to be practicing exclusionary zoning in Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc., - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). Johnson v. Chester County (E.D. Pa., filed Dec. 30,
1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 725 (1976).
160. See note 141 supra. See also Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D.
Ohio), vacated and remanded, 506 F.2d1400 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422
U.S. 1052 (1975).
161. See note 32 supra.
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application. Litigation would seek a denial of all funds.
Another strategy, separate from the Act (although intricately related),
would be to challenge restrictive provisions under state or federal due
process and equal protection clauses, and state zoning enabling laws.
This approach would mandate the steps necessary to meet the
community's burden of producing its "fair share" of regional housing
needs in the mold of Mount Laurel.' 62 Relief in such a case would, in the
first instance, require that the community rewrite its land use laws and
regulations to eliminate such exclusions. Should that fail, litigation
would seek to enjoin HCDA expenditure or condition expenditures on
compliance, strike the restrictions down by court order,' order the
establishment of a local housing authority where none exists, or require
the utilization of all available federal subsidies. 164
Where such remedies fail to achieve the desired objectives, for example
because of an absence of subsidies, the court could establish performance
standards geared to inclusionary zoning or to the adoption of land use
laws or regulations that affirmatively assure the development of lower-
income housing. Such a remedy could condition building permits or
project approval on construction commitments to guarantee a certain
percentage of lower-income housing either within a development or
city,t65 or grant density variances in exchange for renting a percentage of
162. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); see notes 127, 154
and accompanying text supra. Where racial exclusion is involved, claims might be based
upon Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970), in the mold of Evans
v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y.. 1974), rev'd, P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING
113,712 (2d Cir. June 2, 1975), rehearing en banc granted, Potomac Institute, Memo 75-7
(Oct. 20, 1975) (standing granted to ghetto residents to challenge federal sewer and open
space grants to exclusionary communities). But see Upper St. Clair Township v.
Commonwealth, 13 Pa. Commw. 71, 317 A.2d 906 (1974) (holding Dep't of Community
Affairs lacked authority to deny park funds to alleged exclusionary community), and
Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding it improper to enjoin funding
of Model Cities program due to discrimination in public housing site selection program
and continued noncompliance with a district court's orders and decisions). While Upper
St. Clair Township is on appeal, the Gautreaux decision might be distinguished since the
HCDA represents a comprehensive community development program, and discrimina-
tion directly affecting such a stretegy would be closely related to the entire HCDA scheme.
Contra, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969) (federal
school funds to be terminated where used to support a program "infected by a
discriminatory environment").
163. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. IlI. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1111 (1974) (suspension of local governmental approval for public housing sites).
161. See discussion of potential performance relief in Kushner, supra note 92.
165. This is similar to subdivision regulations requiring a dedication of land for green
space or parking.
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units at a below market rate.1 66 If all else fails, inclu-ding the potential of
forcing a repayment of HCDA funds, it may well be necessary for a court,
in a sense, to place the community under receivership so that planning
and development can be carried out apart from political resistance. This
most extraordinary remedy, although it has not yet been ordered in any
case, has certainly been judicially intimated. 67
It should be understood that the distinction in both litigation
strategies and potential remedies between racial exclusion and economic
exclusion may disappear under the Mount Laurel decision. l 8 Where
exclusion can be shown to be racially motivated or where the effect of the
exlusion falls more substantially upon a racial minority, remedies could
also be achieved in a federal forum under notions of equal protection
and the civil rights statutes. 16
Another strategy that might be used to deal with exclusionary land use
166. For a discussion of inclusionary zoning devices see H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK, & A.
LEVIN, supra note 10; Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances, Policy &" Legal Issues in
Requiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1,132
(1974); Rose, From the Legislatures: The Mandatory Percentage of Moderately Priced
Dwelling Ordinance (MPMPD) Is the Latest Technique of Inclusionary Zoning, 3 REAL
ESTATE L.J. 176 (1974); Note, Mandatory Dedication of Land by Land Developers. 26 U.
FLA. L. REV. 41 (1973). But cf. Massachusetts Advisory Comm. to the United States
Comm'n on Civil Rights and the Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, Route
128, Boston's Road to Segregation 62 (1975); Davidoff &c Davidoff, supra note 156. See also
Note, The Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law: First Breach in the Exclusionary Wall, 54
B.U.L. REV. 37 (1974).
167. Compare Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), and Kushner, supra note 92,
with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich.
1971), plan ordered, 357 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1236(6th Cir.
1974), modified, 394 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975)(amended relief previously granted in
1973). It might be argued that in the face of a constitutional violation, where inclusionary
zoning would be ineffectual due to economic impossibility (i.e., free land would not
permit a low-income housing project to be feasible) and subsidies are non-existent, that
communities might be ordered to enact laws requiring developers to create subsidies by
increasing rents for higher income tenants, exacting license taxes on industry to provide
subsidies, or even to exempt a bond issue from the electorate if all else fails.
168. See note 127 supra.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. dened, 122
U.S. 1042 (1975). But see Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir.
1975), rev'g 380 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1974), cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3428 (Jan. 15,1976),
reported in P-H EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 113,736 (1976); Citizens Comm. for
Faraday Woodv. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975). See
also Kushner &- Werner, supra note 60; Sloane, The Changing Shape of Land Use
Litigation: Federal Court Challenges to Exclusionary Land Use Practices, 51 NOTRE DAME
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practices would be the application of NEPA. Requiring the preparation
of an environmental impact statement on the over-all application would
disclose the legal impediments to achieving the HAP and community
development goals. Thus it would force the consideration of litigation
to eliminate restrictive land use practices. 70
Finally, where the excluding community has proposed displacement
of low-income groups (which may have been in residence prior to the
vogue of development and exclusion) the URA171 may provide a means
to halt displacement, order a relocation study, and, where that study
discloses impediments to the provision of replacement housing, order
the construction of housing as a "last resort.' 72
Analogous to an application for CD funds in the face of exclusionary
land use practices is the situation in which an exclusionary community
avoids seeking its CD entitlement in order to avoid any responsibility to
provide lower-income housing. Such an intention, especially if racially
motivated, would be subject to judicial relief.173
170. See the NEPA strategy discussion at notes 233-69 and accompanying text infra.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1970).
172. See the URA strategy discussion at notes 76-95 and accompanying text supra.
173. Some eligible recipients have failed to apply for entitlement funds due to the
responsibility to plan for lower-income housing. See Community Dev. Digest, June 3,
1975, at 1-3, suggesting that a majority of the communities failing to apply did so to avoid
low-income housing and from the expectation that there would be an increase in
withdrawals from the program in future years. Several of the entitled communities
electing to forego HCDA funds have been the sites of embittered litigation over
discriminatory land use practices. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409(7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560(1975) (refusal to
rezone for lower-income housing); Yarborough v. City of Warran, 383 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (upholding referendum repeal of urban renewal program against allegations
of racial motivation to avoid housing responsibilities); Garrett v. Hamtramck, 335 F.
Supp. 16 (E. D. Mich. 1971), plan ordered, 357 F. Supp. 925 (E. D. Mich. 1973), aff'd in part,
503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974), further relief ordered, 394 F. Supp. 1151 (E. D. Mich. 1975)
(displacement of minority residents in absence of relocation housing). In addition, the
hestitation of smaller nonentitlement cities may have prevented some counties from
securing the requisite number of municipalities needed for an urban county application.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974), with id. § 5306. It has been reported that
the refusal of Runnemede in Camden County and Belleville and South Orange in Essex
County, New Jersey, to accept low-income housing precluded those counties from
receiving HCDA funds. 3 HousNG 8c DEv. REP. CURRENT DEV. 233-34 (1975). While there is
no requirement in the HCDA that entitlement communities must apply for funds, and
court% are unlikely to imply such a responsibility, there remains the possibility, albeit a
limited one, that such inaction in the presence of other factors may constitute a claim by
which affirmative relief might be attained. But cf. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). Such
factors might include (a) a history of exclusion of the poor or minorities especially where
there has been prior litigation, (b) a motive to avoid poor or minority residents, or (c)
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D. Housing Assistance Plans and Considerations of Site Selection
A significant body of case law has developed over the past decade that
requires HUD to consider the effect that its site selection practices (in the
location of low- and moderate-income housing) have upon existing and
developing concentrations of racial minorities.174 Repeated examples of
low-income housing concentration followed by judicial relief led to the
recognition of a national policy for dispersal of lower-income housing
denial of funds from HUD on the basis of either exclusionary land use restrictions or the
existence of a practice of discrimination as revealed in the CD application. It is reported
that Baltimore County, Maryland, was dropped as an entitlement urban county due to the
absence of legal authority to carry out renewal activities. It is interesting to note that those
powers were voluntarily relinquished in 1972 in a dispute over whether the county had to
provide low-income housing. Community Dev. Digest, Apr. 8, 1975, at 2. Obviously,
litigation could not be brought under the HCDA due to the lack of provisions mandating
application. First, where the community has engaged in practices that were intended to, or
had the effect of, exclusion of poor and minorities, including the maintenance of
exclusionary land use restrictions, a Mount Laurel type of suit could be brought to
terminate such restrictive practices and mandate certain performance standards. See notes
162-69 and accompanying text supra. Where racial discrimination is involved federal civil
rights statutes and the equal protection clause provide an additional remedy. Cf.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975); United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes
Assoc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010(1971).
Even in the absence of racial motivation or effect, when a community fails to achieve its
"fair share" burden, a court may compel the filing of a CD application to obtain funding
of adjunct facilities, rehabilitate existing available units, and facilitate maximum
utilization of federal subsidies through the HAP and subsidy allocation formulas.
Secondly, where racial considerations are present, constitutional and statutory civil rights
remedies would be available to compel performance standards that would eliminate the
motivation to avoid HCDA benefits and responsibilities in the hopes of not having to
accept lower-income minority residents. See notes 56-67 and accompanying text supra.
Certainly a CD application could be part of judicial relief where appropriate. These same
remedies should lie where an application has been filed and rejected by HUD due to
exclusionary practices. Such a denial of funds would merely exacerbate the need for lower-
income housing and hamper attainment of regional allocation plan goals so that while
HUD cannot supervise local performance in the absence of HCDA funding, the judiciary
could monitor and make necessary orders to eliminate discriminatory practices and see
that HCDA funds are properly utilized.
174. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1975). aff'd sub
nor. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S.Ct. 1538 (1976) (for a further history of the litigation see
Rubinowitz & Dennis, supra note 110); Graves v. Romney, 502 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Banks v.
Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 457 F.2d788 (5th Cir. 1972); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.
La. 1969). See generally Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection, 23
STAN . L. REv. 63 (1970); 7 URBAN L. Ann. 336 (1974).
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opportunities. 75 HUD officiated over the establishment of that policy
when it issued "site selection criteria" regulations designed to assure the
consideration of racial impacts generated by proposed projects. 176 This
concept emerged as Congressional policy in the HCDA, 177 and is
implemented in the HAP application requirement. 78 Even though
Congress has affirmatively acted on this issue, it may still be necessary
for concerned parties to make certain their HAPs are devoid of a racially
impacting effect.
An obvious defect that might be anticipated when reviewing a
community's HAP would be the proposal of a housing project that
would have the effect of economic or racial impaction. This problem
may be obscured in some areas such as Columbia, South Carolina,179 by
HUD's requirement that projects be identified by census tract, for in
some communities projects could be located in different parts of census
175. See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382,390 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'dpercuriam, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
176. 24 C.F.R. § 200.700-.710 (Subpart N, Project Selection Criteria). See also HUD's site
selection regulations for assisted housing under Title II of the HCDA, 24 C.F.R. §
1273.103(j) (1975).
177. The Congress finds and declares that the Nation's cities, towns, and smaller
urban communities face critical social, economic, and environmental problems
arising in significant measure from - ... the concentration of persons of lower
income in central cities .... The primary object of this chapter is the development
of viable urban communities, by providing decent housing and a suitable living
environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of
low and moderate income. Consistent with this primary objective, the Federal
assistance provided in this chapter is for the support of community development
activities which are directed toward the following specific objectives -... (6) the
reduction of the isolation of income groups within communitiesand geographical
areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of
neighborhoods through the spacial deconcentration of housing opportunities for
persons of lower income and the revitalization of deteriorating or deteriorated
neighborhoods to attract persons of higher income ....
-12 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 570.2(a)(6) (1975) (emphasis added).
178. No grant may be made... unless an application shall have been submitted to
the Secretary in which the applicant ... (4) submits a housing assistance plan
which ... (C) indicates the general locations of proposed housing for lower-income
persons. with the objectives of (i) furthering the revitalization of the community,
including the restoration and rehabilitation of stable neighborhoods to the
maximum extent possible, (ii) promoting greater choice of housing opportunities
and avoiding undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high
proportion of low income persons, and (iii) assuring the availability of public
facilities services adequate to serve proposed housing projects ....
42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(C) (Supp. IV, 1974).
179. Comments of Midlands Welfare Rights Organization to the Central Midlands
Regional Planning Council, Mar. 21, 1975. It has been reported that HUD has approved
HAPs in the Boston area despite internal reviews indicating impaction. Potomac Institute,
Inc., The Housing Assistance Plan: A Non-Working Program for Community
Improvement? (Nov. 1975).
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tracts having extremely diverse effects on existing concentrations. Thus,
it may be essential to determine initially the specific location of
proposed projects. It is suggested that a NEPA environmental impact
statement, prepared on the over-all HCDA application, would both
adequately disclose the location of proposed housing and be used as a
vehicle to test the impacts of that location and alternative sites on a city-
wide basis. Such a result would exceed even the congressional hopes that
local officials consider site selection decisions on a comprehensive
basis. 8 0 In addition, proposed impacting projects could be attacked
under the Secretarial review provision calling for compliance with the
provisions of the HCDA18' or on constitutional and civil rights
grounds. 82 Relief under these latter remedies should be limited either to
the denial of all funds under the application or to affirmative relief to
assure that the project will be built in a satisfactory location. Any middle
ground that seeks merely the deletion of the proposed project would
have serious negative impacts. If this approach were taken, the poor
would again be denied what little housing opportunities available to
them and, perhaps more importantly, the precedent could be set for
communities to program unwanted projects for impacted sites to assure
noncompletion. It should be understood that a prerequisite to carrying
out our national dispersal policy is the aggressive opening of our
suburbs and outer cities to their "fair share" of 1ow-income housing
production.
IV. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
The next section of this Article will address problems that might be
encountered after the initial approval of an adequate application. These
problems could arise if a community failed to meet the program
objectives and congressional goals contained in the HCDA and related
legislation. HUD's regulations on performance standards in the areas of
relocation, acquisition, equal opportunity and citizen participation' 83
will be examined along with problems of maintaining local effort,
180. For a discussion of the overall NEPA strategy see notes 233-69 and accompanying
text infra.
181. See note 32 supra. In addition, HUD's noncompliance procedures provide a
potential mechanism for correction. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra. HUD is
considering such an approach in Buffalo, New York. 3 HOUSING & DEV. REP. CURRENT
DEv. 781 (1976).
182. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text supra.
183. Final HUD Reg. § 570.900, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,710-11 (1975).
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carrying out noneligible activities, failure to implement the HAP,
failure to remove exclusionary land use restrictions, and failure to avoid
impacted site selection practices. While HUD regulations require the
filing of a comprehensive annual performance report touching many of
these areas prior to the beginning of each fiscal year commencing with
1977.184 Such belated reports may provide only a postscript to any
program deficiencies given the extensive numbet of recipients and the
limited resources available to HUD for application review and program
monitoring.
A. Relocation
HUD's regulations control relocation performance in an effort to
guarantee proper relocation practices. These regulations require: (1)
information regarding the reason for displacement and whether
displacees are eligible for payments and assistance; (2) referrals to
suitable housing with assistance to obtain the housing; (3) advisory
services to help displacees adjust to the move; (4) benefits to be given to
all eligible displacees; (5) coordination with other concurrent displace-
ment programs; and (6) prompt claim determinations and an effective
grievance mechanism. 85 HUD requires the maintenance of files on each
displacee with claim and grievance forms attached.8 6 In addition,
HUD's regulations cover acquisition policies under displacement
programs. 5 7
181. This report will contain information on the progress of activities, assessments of the
program's effectiveness, information on the housing assistance provided, environmental
reviws undertaken, as well as the citizen participation and public information programs
carried out. Final HUD Reg. § 570.906, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,711-12 (1975). The annual
prformance report must be filed within the 30-day period prior to the submission of the
next year's application and must be made available to local citizens. Id. § 570.300(d), 41
Fed, Rcg, 1132-33 (1976).A performance report disclosing the failure to reach program
goals creates a record upon which to challenge the following year's application.
185. Id. § 570.900(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,711 (1975).
186. Id. § 570.907(d), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,712 (1975). HUD has extended this requirement to
cover all displacement even where the URA is inapplicable. Id.
187. Title III of the URA sets requirements for negotiation, acquisition and litigation.
12 U.S.C. §§-1601. 4602,4621-38,4651-55 (1970). HUD's regulations indicate that Title III
is applicable to the HCDA, and the regulations' performance standards simply call for
local policy to comply with Title III. 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.303(e)(3), 570.900(b) (1975). HUD's
regulations require the recipient to maintain files for each acquisition. These files include
an invitation to accompany appraisers, the appraisal, statement of basis for the
determination of just compensation, conveyance documents and the notice to surrender
possession. Id. § 570.907(e). While Title III of the URA has been held not to be reviewable
in the courts, the HCDA might now provide such a basis for review under the provision
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For several reasons relocation deficiencies may dominate the list of
potential problems encountered under the HCDA. First, no one,
including HUD, has ever mastered the art of relocation planning and
execution. 18 8 Secondly, HUD picked up the tab for relocation costs
under prior displacement programs, while under the HCDA relocation
benefits are an eligible cost paid totally by the recipient. 89 Thus,
recipients may be motivated to minimize costs with the potential for a
reduction in available assistance, services and, most importantly, the
quality of replacement housing. There is absolutely no reason to
anticipate significant improvement over the prior experiences with the
mal-administration of relocation programs.190 Planning will often fail
both in analyzing the costs, availability and conditions of resources, and
in correlating those resources with displacee needs. Concurrent
displacement may not be sufficiently taken into account. Relocation
agencies may ignore the potential for racial and economic impaction
where whites take the opportunity to move to the outer city after
relocation and minorities remain either in their traditional minority-
dominated neighborhoods or move to areas undergoing rapid racial
change. If the planning stage is improperly performed, relocation
specialists will be unable to locate suitable replacement housing.
Displacees may therefore be forced to select unsuitable housing, housing
they cannot afford, or housing in economically and racially impacted
neighborhoods. 191
Where deficiencies are reported to HUD, the noncompliance
procedures section of the HCDA can be utilized to deal with the
requiring compliance with the provisions of the Act and calling for Secretarial review. See
note 32 supra; cf. Paramount Farms, Inc. v. Morton, 527 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1975);
Seeherman v. Lynn, 404 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Whitman v. State Highway
Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Bethune v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1074
(W.D. Mo. 1972); Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Martinez v.
HUD, 347 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Rubin v. HUD, 347 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Will-Tex Plastics Mfg., Inc. v. HUD, 346 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1399
(3d Cir. 1973). In addition, defects could be dealt with through the noncompliance
procedures upon request to the Secretary. See notes 192-93 and accompanying text infra.
188. See notes 78, 85 and 94 supra.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)( 11) (Supp. IV, 1974); Final HUD Reg. § 570.200(a)(l 1), 40 Fed.
Reg. 24,699 (1975).
190. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
191. Such violations of the HCDA also constitute noncompliance with the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,42 U.S.C. § 4601
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problem. 92 Under these provisions HUD must provide the recipient
with notice and an opportunity for a hearing before an administrative
law judge. After this hearing the Secretary can terminate or reduce
payments, or request the Attorney General to sue for a recovery of
payments or for injunctive relief. 9
In summary, it can be anticipated that relocation under the HCDA
will cease to be such a popular practice for a number of reasons. First,
relocation costs make large-scale clearance prohibitively expensive.
Secondly, displacement and demolition proposals can jeopardize the
achievement of HAP goals. Thirdly, a tight housing supply can make
relocation administration difficult and prone to delay by litigation.
Fourthly, rehabilitation and preservation strategies should alleviate
future needs to rely upon clearance for housing and urban development.
Finally, community resistance to displacement will continue to present
local government with confrontation on such proposals. 94
B. Equal Opportunity in Performance
HUD regulations include performance standards on equal oppor-
tunity that require the documentation of compliance with equal
opportunity guidelines'95 and the maintenance of files on that
documentation. 9 6 Where equal opportunity violations are encountered,
192. 42 U.S.C. § 5311 (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. § 570.913 (1975).
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5311(a), (b) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.913(a), (b) (1975).
Decisions of HUD's administrative law judge are reviewable by the United States Court of
Appeals in the circuit with jurisdiction over the recipient. 42 U.S.C. § 531 l(c)(Supp. IV,
1974); 24 C.F.R. § 570.913(o) (1975). It is unclear whether it would be more desirable to
pursue litigation under the URA or attempt to encourage HUD to institute non-
compliance proceedings. The HUD procedures guarantee substantial delay, while
temporary injunctive relief via the URA might be available more quickly should
irreparable harm be threatened. Although it is conceivable that HUD could by-pass its
slow mechanism by referring the matter to the Attorney General for litigation, the
prospects for swift relief are dubious. 42 U.S.C. § 5311(b) (Supp. IV, 1974); 24 C.F.R. §
570.913(a) (1975).
194. A survey conducted by the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials has found that almost 30% of its sample of HCDA recipients were intentionally
avoiding displacement activities due to the high costs of relocation. National Ass'n of
Housing 9. Redev. Officials, NAHRO Reports on Its Monitoring of the First Year of the
Commumty Development Program, 32 J. HousING 445, 447 (1975).
195. 24 C.F.R. § 570.900(c) (1975).
196. Id. § 570.907(f). The documentation must cover actions undertaken on the
following issues: (a) methods of administration to assure that persons were not excluded
from participation in, denied the benefits of, or otherwise subjected to discrimination
under funded activities, id. § 570.900(c)( 1)(i); (b) criteria used for selecting public facilities
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litigation could be undertaken under the equal protection clause and
applicable civil rights statutes, including the HCDA provisions. 97
HUD has also promulgated nondiscrimination compliance regulations
wherein the recipient will be provided an opportunity to achieve
compliance. If the recipient fails to comply HUD can refer the matter to
the Attorney General or for a hearing under the HUD noncompliance
procedures. 9 '
C. Citizen Participation
The performance standards under the HUD regulations make several
important program requirements 99 First, a local citizen participation
plan must be developed and made public.2 0 0 Secondly, the recipient
sites, id. § 570.900(c)(l)(ii); (c) plans for overcoming the effects of conditions which
resulted in limited participation, in the past, under similar programs, zd. §
570.900(c)(1)(iii); (d) promotion of equal employment opportunity, id. § 570.900(c)( 1)(iv);
(e) encouragement of the development and enforcement of fair housing laws, id. §
570.900(c)(2)(i); (f) prevention of discrimination in housing and related facilities
developed and generated with HCDA assistance and in the lending practices of recipients
or lending institutions, id. § 570.900(c)(2)(ii); (g) assurance that land use and development
programs funded by the HCDA provide greater housing opportunities throughout the
planning area, id. § 570.900(c)(2)(iii); and (h) promotion of equal opportunity in housing
through site selection, id. § 570.900(c)(2)(iv).
To assist HUD in monitoring, recipients must retain the following data: (a)
demographic data by census tract including population, with breakdowns by race, ethnic
group, sex, age and head of household, id. § 570.907(f)( 1); (b) racial, ethnicand gender data
showing the extent to which these categories of persons have participated in, or benefited
from funded programs and activities, id. § 570.907(f)(2); (c) information on affirmative
action in employment including upgrading, demotions, transfers, recruitment or
recruitment advertising, layoffs, terminations, compensation and selection for training,
id. § 570.907(f)(3); and (d) good-faith efforts to identify, train and/or hire lower-income
residents of the project area and to utilize business concerns which are located in or owned
in substantial part by persons residing in the area of the project, id. § 570.907(f)(4). This
provision is designed to help implement § 3 of the Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1701(u) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV,1974). See 24 C.F.R. § 135 (1975)
(Employment Opportunities for Businesses and Lower Income Persons in Connection
with Assisted Projects).
197. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text supra.
198. 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.912-13 (1975). For a discussion of HUD's noncompliance
procedures see notes 192-93 and accompanying text supra.
199. Final HUD Reg. § 570.900(d), 40 Fed Reg. 24,711 (1975).
200. Under this plan, the recipient must specify a timetable and indicate: (a) how
information will be disseminated; (b) when, in the initial planning process, hearings will
be held; (c) when and how citizens will have an opportunity to participate in the
development of the application; (d) how technical assistance will be provided to assist
citizen participants in understanding program requirements; and (e) the nature and
timing of citizen participation in the development of any future community development
program amendments, including reallocation of funds and designation of new activities
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must afford an adequate opportunity to permit "citizens likely to be
affected by community development and housing activities, including
low and moderate income persons, . . to articulate needs, express
preferences about proposed activities, assist in the selection of priorities,
and otherwise participate in the development of the application, and
have individual and other complaints answered in a timely and
responsive manner. '20' In addition, the annual performance report
must describe the progress made toward meeting these performance
standards.2 02 In accord with these requirements recipients must
maintain records that contain accounts of public hearings and
narratives, and must keep other records outlining the information and
opportunities for participation provided.2°3
The performance standards would seem to assure a continuous,
ongoing citizen participation mechanism for overall community
development to permit participation in amendments2 04 and future
development projects, as well as local ongoing mechanisms relating to
specific ongoing projects. In a most unexpected ruling, HUD even went
so far as to determine that the performance requirements apply to pre-
application citizen participation and that initial application certifica-
tion relating to citizen participation could be attacked if the perfor-
mance standards were not complied with.20 5 Inequities, however, still
or locations. Id. § 570.900(d)(1), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,711 (1975). In this new regulation HUD
has clarified its position that such plans and timetables must be made public.
201. Id. § 570.900(d)(2), 40 Fed. Reg. 24, 711 (1975) (suggesting bilingual opportunities
for citizen participation where feasible). Previously, the regulation had called for the
recipient to develop a local process that would permit this described quality of
participation to occur. 24 C.F.R. § 570.900(d)(2) (1975). HUD explained that the
amendment and deletion was "to avoid unintended limitations beyond the requirements
of this section." 40 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (1975). The impact of the amendment is unclearbut it
can be expected that recipients will argue that they need not create or recognize ongoing
citizen groups. In rebuttal citizens might argue that without a local process of some sort
beyond occasional public meetings, meaningful input and participation is an
impossibility and that HUD's regulation was intendedonly to indicate its roleand was not
meant to define the mechanism.
202. 24 C.F.R. § 507.906(b)(6) (1975).
203. Id. § 507.907(b) (1975).
201. Suit was filed in Edison, New Jersey, alleging the failure to include citizens in a
HUD-ordercd application amendment. NAACP v. Hills, Civil No. 75-1461 (D.N.J., filed
Aug. 22. 1975), reported zn 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 422 (1975). The suit was subsequently
settled. See 3 HOUSING 9: DEv. REP. CURRENT DEV. 865 (1976). A similarclaim has been filed
in Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filed July 23,
1975), reported 2n Community Dev. Digest, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1-2.
205. U.S. Dep't Housing & Urban Dev., Special Issues Committee, reported in 2
HOUSING & DEv. REP. 999 (1975).
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Where the recipient has failed to live up to citizen participation
performance standards, or has failed to fully comply with amendment
procedures, HUD may be requested to intervene under its non-
compliance procedures.207 As a litigation strategy, complainants may
sue HUD and the recipients to force compliance with the Act, for the
citizen participation requirements clearly exist for the benefit of the
affected citizens.208
D. Failure to Implement the Housing Assistance Plan
Given the questionable success of the Workable Program re-
quirements in expanding the supply of low-income housing,2  it
should be expected that HCDA recipients will have a difficult time
meeting their HAP goals for lower-income housing production.
Litigation strategies at this stage may take seVeral forms. First, if the
failure to carry out the plan is racially motivated, the constitutional and
statutory civil rights remedies would be available to compel compliance
and to establish performance orders.21 0 Where the failure to expand the
housing supply occurs in the face of demolition and displacement, the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970211 would provide a remedy to enjoin displacement 212 and
possibly to compel construction of housing with HCDA funds under the
206. While lower-income residents must be involved in specific project proposals, there
is no such requirement for the overall planning group. This poses the danger of having a
"blue ribbon" committee that may not represent or be sensitive to the interests of the poor.
See note 99 and accompanying text supra. It should also be noted that any amendments to
the initial application must contain a certification indicating that the amendment
conformed with all citizen participation requirements applicable to the initial
application, including the two hearing processes. Final HUD Reg. § 570.305(a), 40 Fed.
Reg. 24,702 (1975).
207. See notes 192-93 and accompanying text supra.
208. Cf. Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974);
Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It would be advisable to name
HUD as a party to permit mandamus jurisdiction to force compliance with the Act. 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
209.42 U.S.C. § 1451(1970). See Ley v. Shell Oil Co., Civil No. C-71 1645 RFP (N.D. Cal.
1972); LeGates, The Workable Program; Litigation and More Administrative Complaints
Bringing Results, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 137 (1971); National Housing & Dev. Law
Project, The Workable Program, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 243 (1970).
210. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text supra.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1970).
212. See notes 76-95 and accompanying text supra.
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"Houser of Last Resort" provisions. 213
It might be expected that some noncompliance will result from the
lack of federal housing subsidies, in which case citizens should
encourage HUD to have communities amend their activities to devote
more CD funds to housing rehabilitation programs. The failure to carry
out the goals may not amount to noncompliance in some cases, but
when bad faith or lack of diligence is responsible HUD could use its
noncompliance procedures to compel more activity.21 4 In addition, suit
could lie under the mandamus statute to compel HUD and the recipient
to comply with the Act and carry out their responsibilities.21 5 This may
be particularly relevant where noncompliance occurs in the face of the
HUD subsidy moratorium.
Considering the large number of outer-city HCDA recipients, it may
also be expected that implementation of the Act will not purge
recipients of prior exclusionary land use practices. Remedies would
exist under HUD's nondiscrimination 16 and noncompliance217
procedures, constitutional and statutory civil rights requirements, 218 a
Mount Laurel type of exclusionary land use suit,219 and through a suit to
mandate HUD and the recipient to comply with the Act.220
E. Avoidance of Program Requirements
Avoidance occurs if a recipient uses devices to avoid arduous or costly
responsibilities under the Act. The potential for avoidance is perhaps
213. See Final HUD Reg. § 570.201(f), 41 Fed. Reg. 2768 (1976).
214. See notes 192-93 and accompanying text supra.
215. See note 208 and accompanying text supra. It should also be noted that recipients
might engage in illegal site selection impacting practices despite representations
contained in an approved HAP. Despite the disclosures and protections contained in the
various regulations (see notes 174-82, 195-98 and accompanying text supra), if projects and
housing opportunities have the effect of causing further concentration of either low-
income or minority persons, relief would lie under HUD's nondiscrimination procedures
(see note 203 and accompanying text supra) as well as litigation strategies. Where racial
impaction has occurred or is threatened, one could proceed on constitutional and statutory
civil rights bases. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text supra. In the case of economic
impaction, as well as racial impaction, HCDA requirements would be violated and HUD
and the recipient could be compelled to comply with the Act.
216. See note 198 and accompanying text supra.
217. See notes 192-93 and accompanying text supra.
218. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text supra.
219. See notes 162-69 and accompanying text supra.
220. See note 208 and accompanying text supra.
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greatest in the areas of compliance under NEPA and the URA. 2 1 This is
due to the huge costs involved that must be assumed, for the most part,
by the recipient, and due to the distaste that agencies have for such red
tape.222 The most overt example of avoidance would occur if a recipient
undertook a strict area-wide code enforcement program in a deteriorated
housing area prior to submitting an application calling for acquisition
and clearance in the same area. The effect would, in many cases, result in
displacement; displacement that would not be assisted under the URA
due to the absence of acquisition and federal assistance. At the
application approval stage only demolition and inexpensive land
acquisition would remain as an impediment to development or land
marketing, thus greatly reducing the costs of the activity as well as the
time required for execution. Such attempts at avoidance have,
unfortunately, already proceeded beyond the hypothetical stage.
In Charlotte, North Carolina, for example, while HCDA application
proceedings were going on, the city began systematic code enforcement
in a low-income black area of the city. The section of the city was slated
for activity under the city's plan, and it was alleged that the city planned
only to acquire existing "good quality" housing, as the deteriorated
housing would be vacated by code enforcement. This would have
permitted the city to later amend its plans to acquire the abandoned or
condemned housing while paying relocation benefits only to those in
good housing. When these allegations were brought to the attention of
the city council of Charlotte, the city council ordered the payment of
URA benefits to all persons displaced by code enforcement as well as
acquisition.2 3
Another avoidance mechanism may emerge where a recipient
221. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1970).
222. See generally Hearings on Red Tape, supra note 2.
223. This is permitted under HUD's relocation regulations. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING &
URBAN DEV., HUD HANDBOOK, RELOCATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURE, 1371.1 rev. ch. 1.
11-6(b)(2) (Feb. 20, 1975). A less pronounced example of such tactics occurred when
Macon, Georgia, acquired the right of way for a highway improvement project with
general revenue sharing funds and now proposes to use HCDA funds to put in new water
facilities and fire hydrants. Goolsby v. Simon, Civil No. 75-74 MAC (M.D. Ga., Mar. 1.
1976); interview with Mrs. Mary B. Asbell, Director, Community Dev. Dep't. in Macon.
Ga., May 1, 1975;9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 131 (1975). Ingranting thegovernment's motions
for summary judgment, the Goolsby court ruled that the CD expenditures were de
minimus. Despite HUD's regulations making URA applicable to any CD expenditures.
the court held the activity was too slight to convert the entire project to the status of a
"federal program" requiring URA applicability. Goolsby v. Simon, Civil Action No. 75-
74 MAC (M.D. Ga., Mar. 1, 1976). See also note 227 infra.
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negotiates with a private developer interested in acquiring occupied
land for development activities. The city might urge the developer to
acquire the property on the open market in the absence of URA benefits
and acquisition policy compliance, with the city promising to condemn
certain parcels if the developer was unable to secure the purchase of the
desired land. This practice allegedly occurred recently in San Diego with
regard not to HCDA funds, but in avoidance of the California
Relocation Assistance Law22 ' requirements that are modeled after the
URA. The California Legislature responded with an amendment to the
state relocation law to cover such tactics. 22 5
Such practices clearly constitute an evasion of the law,226 and courts
are unlikely to permit the observance of form over substance.2 27
Therefore, a URA litigation strategy should provide compliance under
the illustrations of avoidance provided here.22 8 Where avoidance
practices are directed at minority groups, a strategy under constitutional
and statutory civil rights provisions should prove effective.229 In
22 1. CAL. GOV'T. CODE. ANN. §§ 7260-74 (Deering Supp. 1975).
225. The amendment covers acquisition "by a public entity or by any person having an
agreement with or acting on behalf of a public entity." Id. § 7260.
226. HUD apparently takes the position that the URA applies where displacement
results from any land acquisition for a CD funded activity, regardless of how the specific
acquisition is financed. For example, city acquisition in contemplation of a future CD
funded project would be covered. Housing Affairs Letter 6, June 13, 1975 (citing HUD's
amended regulations ofJune 9,1975); see Final HUD Reg. § 570.602(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 24,708
(1975).
227. Cf. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 416 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972) (decision to
not seek federal funds for a small highway segment that ran through a city park to avoid
difficulties in compliance with environmental and protective parklands statutes);
Mathcws v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See also La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488
F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974) (potential for utilizing federal
funds requirtd compliance with federal highway requirements).
More subtle instances of avoidance may go unremedied in the courts. In Macon,
Georgia, the city used general revenue sharing funds (State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act
of 1972. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-64 (Supp. II, 1972)) to displace residents for a proposed street
widening and highway improvement project, subsequently using HCDA funds to provide
water and sewage components for the project. The district court held that the participation
was insufficient to require URA application to the entire project and that the URA is
inapplicable to general revenue sharing. Goolsby v. Simon, No. 75-74 MAC (M.D. Ga.,
Mar. 1. 1976) (decision rested on a ruling that NEPA was inapplicable to general revenue
sharing). See Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd, 522 F.2d
295 (Ith Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (NEPA not applicable to general revenue sharing).
228. Fora discussion of the URA strategy, see notes 76-95 and accompanying text supra.
229. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text supra.
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addition, where such discrimination occurs, the HUD discrimination
compliance procedures may provide a route to a remedy,230 as will the
noncompliance procedures, wherever avoidance has occurred.23 1 Also,
the strategy of seeking mandamus against HUD and the recipient
should provide a method to compel compliance with the avoided
requirements. 2 32 There would also appear to be an action maintainable
under common law fraud.
V. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACr OF 1969
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires that
prior to taking action on a federal or federally assisted project that
significantly affects the "environment, the responsible official prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) that carefully examines the
impacts of the proposed action and surveys the various alternatives to
the project. 233 The HCDA complements NEPA by requiring the latter's
policies to be "effectively implemented. '234 The following section will
demonstrate that not only must recipients comply with NEPA on
specific project proposals, but it is advisable that they also review their
entire application to determine whether potential impacts of the totality
of proposed activities are significant and, more importantly, whether
alternatives exist that require either the preparation of an EIS on the
total plan or a reviewable declaration that an EIS need not be prepared.
Primary responsibility for deciding whether to prepare on EIS and for
deciding whether a prepared statement is adequate lies with the
recipient. HUD's role is essentially that of an independent commentator
on the decisions made by the recipient.235 Given the huge cost of NEPA
230. See note 198 and accompanying text supra.
231. See notes 192-93 and accompanying text supra.
232. See note 208 and accompanying text supra.
233.42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(D) (Pamphlet No. 5,
1975).
234.42 U.S.C. § 5304(h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). For a detailed examination of § 104(h) of the
HCDA and its implementing regulations see Note, HUD's NEPA Responsibilities Under
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: Delegation or Derogation?, 10
URBAN L. ANN. 179 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, HUD's NEPA Responsibilities].
235. See Note, HUD's NEPA Responsibilities, supra note 234, at 187. See generally
Comment, Controversial NEPA Implementation at HUD: Shifting Environmental
Review Responsibilities to Local Grant Applicants, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10,193
(1974). The delegation authorized by the HCDA has been attacked by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency as causing delays and for encouraging or forcing
localities to plan activities that will not require significant environmental analysis. In
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compliance, communities may be motivated to make findings that no
EIS is required.2 3 6 If it is determined that an EIS is required, it will most
assuredly be prepared from a self-interested point of view, placing the
community's proposed project in the best light possible.
It is very hard to clearly define what activities require an EIS
preparation 2"7 but some examples are worth identifying. Highway
improvements, 238 urban renewal or NDP activities, 23 9 housing produc-
tion,2 10 surcharges on freight rates, 241 and even the sale by HUD of
foreclosed houses2 4 all have been held to require the preparation of an
EIS. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has interpreted the
requirement very broadly. 24s The CEQ definition may not be definitive
but it does indicate that NEPA's applicability is extensive. The courts
reviewing NEPA have frequently called for strict compliance with its
requirements and have in many cases leaned toward a finding of
applicability where the law has not been clearly to the contrary. 244 In
light of NEPA's policy, CEQ's broad interpretation of its coverage, and
addition, EPA is rejecting more statements prepared under the HCDA than under any
other federal program. 6 ENVIRONMENT REP. CURRENT DEV. 1074 (1975). Poor efforts at
compliance with NEPA plagued HUD even before the 1974 delegation of authority.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT EFFORTS FOR PROPOSED PROJECTS
HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE - DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1975).
236. See Note, HUD's NEPA Responsibilities, supra note 234, at 201-02.
237. See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 56-141 (1973); U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban
De'., Environmental Reviews at the Community Level, Oct. 1975; Yarrington, The
National Environmental Policy Act, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL REP. Monograph No. 17, at 22
(1974).
238. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971).
239. See, e.g.. Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); Businessmen Affected Severely by Yearly Action
Plans, Inc., v. City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972). In Bois D'Arc Patriots v. City
of Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filedJuly 23,1975), plaintiffs seek coverage of
an expanded code enforcement program. Community Dev. Digest, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1-2.
2.10. Compare Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973) (EIS required on 138-unit
project), with Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973) (no EIS
required on 272-unit project), and Echo Park v. Romney, 3 E.R.C. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(no EIS required on 66-unit project).
241. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), rev'g on other grounds, 346 F. Supp.
189 (D.D.C. 1972).
242. Brotherhood Blocks Ass'n v. HUD, 5 E.R.C. 1867 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
243. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1975).
211. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fundv. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d289 (8th Cir.)
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th
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the interpretation of applicability received in many courts, it can be said
that in HCDA litigation the courts are likely to find NEPA's
requirements binding. HUD has developed certain threshold points
where projects must receive EIS treatment.2 5 These are only guides,
however, and the courts may not be willing to recognize projects below
these threshold points as exempt from NEPA. 246 In the past, where
projects were deemed to require preparation of an impact statement,
courts did not hesitate to grant injunctive relief and assure NEPA
compliance.2 47
HUD has taken the position that the preparation of an impact
statement on the application itself would be inconsistent with section
104(h) of the Act.248 This position, however, may not stand. While
section 104(h) refers to releasing funds for specific "projects," it should
not be read to sub silentio amend or limit NEPA to projects as opposed
to the overall activities impact.249 If anything, section 104(h) provides
Cir. 1972); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.
1971); National Helium Co. v. Morton, 455 F.2d650 (10th Cir. 1971); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
245. 24 C.F.R. § 58.25 (1975). This regulation requires that an EIS be prepared(unless
there is specific HUD waiver based upon HUD preparation under another program) on
any project to "remove, demolish, convert or emplace a total of 500 or more dwelling
units" or where water and sewer facilities will serve "undeveloped areas of 100 acres or
more."
246. In Goolsby v. Simon,Civil No. 75-74-MAC (M.D. Ga., Mar. 1, 1976), reported in 9
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 131 (1975), the court found that HCDA funded water and sewer
improvements made in conjunction with a general revenue sharing funded street
widening project did not subject HUD or the city to responsibility for compliance with
NEPA. See Note, HUD's NEPA Responsibilities, supra note 234, at 185 n.44.
247. Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Romney,
473 F. 2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973); Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d823 (2dCir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 908 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972);
Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972); District of Columbia Federation of Civic
Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Arlington
Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972) cert. d,i-d 409 U.S. I000
(1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971). A test of the effectiveness of
congressional delegation of NEPA duties may arise when Dallas, Texas, defendsa finding
that no EIS was required on a major code enforcement and demolition project. Bois D'Arc
Patriots v. City of Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-D (N.D. Tex., filedJuly 23,1975), reported zn
Community Dev. Digest, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1-2 (alleginga reduction of low-income housing
will result in increased costs, evictions and housing abandonment).
248. 24 C.F.R. § 58 (1975). HUD's position has been taken at face value without analysis
in Ulster Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Koenig, 402 F. Supp. 986,991-92 (S.D. N.Y.
1975). This issue has also been raised in Bois D'Arc Patriots v. Dallas, Civil No. 3-75-0906-
D (N.D. Tex., filed July 23, 1975).
249. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Note, HUD's NEPA
Responsibilities, supra note 234, at 191-93; cf. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
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HUD with some discretion to permit project expenditures where other
proposed projects fail to meet the NEPA process requirements, as
opposed to forcing HUD into writing off all HCDA funds when a
community fails to carry out its responsibilities. An argument to
support HUD's position is that the overall NEPA analysis runs counter
to the intent of HCDA. to eliminate red-tape and the traditional federal
bureaucratic requirements. This argument falters, however, upon a
simple reading of section 104(h), which declares that NEPA re-
quirements are not to be diminished. If Congress seriously intended to
replace community development red-tape with a pure revenue sharing
scheme, certainly NEPA analysis would have been clearly eliminated or
diluted-something Congress was unwilling to do.
A "project only" view of NEPA applicability was taken by the AEC
regarding its fast breeder nuclear reactor research program. The
government argued unsuccessfully in Scientists' Institute for Public
Information, Inc. v. AEC250 that impact statements on individual re-
actor construction projects would meet NEPO requirements. The
court held that in view of the -magnitude of planning and research
involved in the program, an environmental analysis should be made of
the research project and the overall program policy. The analogy to a
community development application can be made with little difficulty.
First, the EIS would be appropriate for an applicant's identification of
need for community development activity.2 51 The HCDA application
represents a total analysis and program to deal with a recipient's
community development needs. This plan lends itself extremely well to
an overall environmental analysis, something that may be impossible
250. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord, American Elec. Power Sys. v. Sierra Club,
conmoldated with Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96
S.Ct. 772 (1976); See Comment, Comprehensive Planning Under NEPA: D.C. Circuit
Widens Applicability of Program Impact Statement, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 10118
(1975); Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements Under The
Environmental Policy Act: A Definition Approach, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 124 (1975). See
also National Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), where
the Department of Interior prepared a programmatic EIS on western grazing permits but
wrongly failed to prepare EIS's for subdistricts. The Interior Department has agreed not to
appeal the litigation and will prepare 212 statements over the next 13 years. 6
ENVIRONMENT REP CURRENT DEv. 388-89 (1975); see Kelly v. Butz, 404 F. Supp. 925 (W.D.
Mich. 1975). But cf. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975),
aff'g 372 F.Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1462 (1976) (no overall EIS
required for scattered site public housing program).
251. For a discussion of the problems of consistency of needs see notes 22-30 and
accompanying text supra.
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on a project-by-project basis in terms of identifying priorities and the
consideration of alternative projects. 252 It is ironic that HUD previously
recognized that certain comprehensive activities would require overall
assessment: "Individual actions that are related either geographically or
as logical parts in a composite of contemplated actions may be more
appropriately evaluated in a single environmental clearance. '253
Secondly, it is with respect to the issue of program priorities that
NEPA applicability makes imminent sense.254 HUD recognized, prior to
passage of the HCDA, that environmental considerations include such
items as "land use planning, site selection and design, . . urban
congestion, overcrowding, displacement and relocation resulting from
public or private action[,] ... urban blight, code violations, and
building abandonment, urban sprawl, urban growth policy... -"255
These environmental issues are implicitly related to the goals and
provisions of the HCDA. A CD program formulated with an eye to
HUD's present interpretation of section 104(h) could ignore significant
problems and potentially result in an ever-increasing deterioration of
environmental quality despite HCDA expenditures. Pictures of such
phenomena are easy to formulate. Such a result might be caused by the
failure to address the cause of blight where slum clearance merely results
in the poor being forced into overcrowded conditions in surrounding
neighborhoods, with increasingly deferred maintenance by citizens
awaiting stabilized conditions (never seeing themselves as significant
contributors to the pathology). While the slum clearance activities
might in a vacuum pass NEPA and HCDA muster, such activities, in the
absence of supporting code enforcement and adjunct blight prevention
programs, may be counter-productive. A similar result might occur if a
community, in an effort to appease constituents and vocal political
factions, spreads a little CD money to every neighborhood and census
252. It might be noted that California's Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), modeled
after NEPA, has been administratively determined to require the preparation of an
environmental impact report on CD applications. Letter from California Attorney
General's Office to the Office of Planning & Research, Cal., Dec. 6, 1974. The city of San
Francisco, believing that NEPA also applies to the application despite the HUD
-regulations, prepared a joint EIS/EIR under CEQA and NEPA and assured compliance
with both laws. Draft Environmental Impact Report and Statement for the Community
Development and Housing Proposal for HUD Block Grant, EE 75.3, City of San
Francisco, Calif., Jan. 17, 1975.
253. See 39 Fed. Reg. 6816, 6819 (1974).
254. See the discussion of the appropriateness of activities at notes 31-42 and
accompanying text supra.
255. See 39 Fed. Reg. 6816 (1974).
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tract. It may never be realized that the level of activity is so thin that the
net effect could cause residents to defer making repairs and await
subsidized rehabilitation or relocation only to observe exacerbated
blight and the neighborhood falling apart at an ever increasing speed. A
careful look at the level of proposed activities might suggest a need for
concentrated treatment and such analysis could best be done on an
application or city-wide basis. The major benefits of NEPA are the
identification of potential impacts256 and the consideration of alter-
native strategies including project abandonment. 257 When HUD, since
1954 in the Workable Program requirements, later in the Community
Renewal Program, and now in the HCDA, argues so strenuously for
comprehensive planning, it is ironic that it is in a posture of resisting
NEPA applicability when it would be beneficial to the planning
process.258
A third situation in which a NEPA analysis would be beneficial
would be when an application is so vague as to the location and extent of
projects that the public and decision makers would have to guess at the
proposed activity and its potential effects. An impact statement review
process would have to disclose the nature and extent of proposed
activities to permit an analysis of impacts and the consideration of
alternatives. 259
Fourthly, where an applicant is engaged in a discriminatory housing
policy260 the NEPA procedure might aid in the disclosure of that process
and provide a vehicle for attack. The EIS on the overall application may
well provide an extremely powerful tool to define and measure the
extent of the discriminatory treatment. But more importantly, it could
provide a vehicle to review and control the final decisions on whether to
proceed with planned activities or to restructure the application to
affirmatively address the affected community development need.
Certainly contractions of the housing supply or displacement into
256. See, e.g., Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
257. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
258. HUD also opposed federal land use legislation in 1975 for budgetary reasons. 5
ENVIRONMENT REP. CURRENT DEV. 1823 (1975).
259. See note 32 supra.
260. See notes 57-95 and accompanying text supra.
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overcrowded or substandard units are blighting influences and
environmental impacts worthy of extended study.
Lastly, the EIS may be effective in dealing with an applicant's
exclusionary land use practices.261 Requiring the preparation of an
environmental impact statement on the over-all application would
disclose the legal impediments to achieving the HAP and community
development goals and thus force the consideration of mitigating
measures such as the elimination of restrictive land use practices.
Were a court to order that NEPA applied at the application stage the
relief would be an injunction pending the preparation of an
environmental impact statement and review262 with possible exceptions
for activities essential for public health reasons.2 6 There is also
authority for the affirmative order to prepare an impact statement.26
4
The environmental impact statement would have to either include or
refer to available studies, or make new studies if existing ones are dated
or not trustworthy.265 This strategy would fulfill the requirement of
studies "generally available" in the community.266 If impact statements
were made the needs of the community would become clear. A statement
of needs in the HCDA application at variance with an impact statement
would be "plainly inconsistent" with generally available facts and data,
requiring disapproval of the application.
No attempt will be made in this Article to indicate the depth required
in environmental impact reporting on the various types of community
development projects that will be undertaken. However, simply filing
261. See notes 156-82 and accompanying text supra.
262. See note 247 supra.
263. Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp. 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423
U.S. 809 (1975); Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973).
264. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Scherr v.
Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972).
265. See, e.g., Swain v. Brinegar, 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v.
Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Rankin v. Coleman, 394 F. Supp. 647 (E.D.N.C.
1975); Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1975); Keith v.
Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Keith v. California Highway
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
266. The NEPA strategy also raises the specter of forum shopping as well as defendant
shopping since NEPA claims may be raised in state or federal court. In addition, suing the
recipient and not HUD will often produce a defendant inexperienced with both NEPA and
the federal court review and litigation process (see Note, HUD's NEPA Responszbilitzes,
supra note 234, at 198-200), while naming HUD in an action to enjoin the release of HCDA
funds will result in a defense by the U.S. Attorney and possibly the Justice Department.
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and circulating an "environmental impact statement" does not end
either the recipient's responsibilities or those of the reviewing court.
Cases uniformly have held that the EIS is not a "paper tiger" but rather
must adequately and comprehensively outline impacts and alternatives
to proposed actions.26
NEPA can be used in litigation as a mechanism to assure that the
impacts and alternatives of porposed activities are comprehensively
studied. Where a recipient proposes CD activities that have the effect of
deferring realistic solutions to blight and deterioration, proposes
projects in the absence of strategies to avoid the future spread of blight,
contracts the communities' lower-income housing supply with the
potential for overcrowding, or simply ignores the communities' real
community development needs, NEPA stands as the best tool for forcing
official analysis of the issues.
Where community development activities are proposed which pose
the threat of environmental harm, either through the potential for
secondary growth and blight production or in the context of immediate
harm to the community through contraction of the housing supply, to
the extent that courts will be willing to go in substituting their
judgment for that of the decisionmakers who, under the HCDA, are the
recipients becomes an issue. While the "inappropriate" provision of the
Secretarial review procedures can be used to attack proposed harmful
activities, 26  NEPA provides a means to require that issues be
comprehensively studied and that decisions reached be consistent with
NEPA and not "arbitrary" or "capricious. '269
CONCLUSION
The goals of Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 can best be achieved with an aggressive attitude on the part of
recipients to comply with the letter of the law and, more importantly, to
seriously address the housing and community development needs of all
267. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 101 U.S. 942 (1972). A question may remain, however, whether the EIS as employed
by an HCDA rccipient will remain an effective vehicle in forcing the responsible official to
makt- a good faith effort toward limiting any adverse effects of HCDA-aided projects on the
unvironment. See Note, HUD's NEPA Responsibilities, supra note 234, at 198-202.
268. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
269. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC,
1,19 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
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segments of its population. This Article is designed to alert HUD, the
legal community, HCDA recipients, and Title I block grant
beneficiaries to potential violations of the HCDA or problems that may
occur in the Act's implementation. The emphasis on litigation is
designed to demonstrate the seriousness of a callous approach toward
strict compliance with the law. The summary discussion of remedies is
intended to define the scope of judicial relief rather than to recommend
how to proceed under the various suggested litigation strategies. It
should be recognized that whether the Act provides a reviewable
standard under which a community's performance can be tested and
modified will depend on a number of factors in each case. When the
application is being reviewed on its face, success may well depend upon
the availability of studies clearly presenting inconsistency with the
submitted application. Where a specific strategy is attacked, success will
probably turn on how outrageous the community's actions are in
comparison to existing needs and alternative programs. Total ignorance
of lower-income resident needs may be remediable, but courts are
unlikely to second guess a strategy chosen by the applicant to deal with
its recognized ills. Most notably, the Act will be of greatest use to those
desiring to attack exclusionary tactics of suburban communities where
there exists a continued policy of refusing to address the need for lower-
income housing opportunity.
The author believes, based on the litigation experience under the
prior law, that community development litigation is generally too costly
and too complex to be expected in a significant number of communities.
However, more legal challenges have been made in the first year of the
HCDA than under the past decade of urban renewal and categorical
grants. While this increase may subside as the newness of the HCDA
wears off, success by the initial litigants may have the opposite result,
especially given the growth in the sophistication of citizens concerned
with community development issues. This litigation will probably be
effective, if at all, in at least compelling the promulgation of additional
HUD review standards for all recipients, and in encouraging most
recipients to adopt court-established principles rather than risk the costs
of protracted litigation. The newest litigation tool in the area of
community development, and one which perhaps will provide
recipients the greatest fear, is NEPA. Except in those states with state
versions of the federal environmental law270 most recipients have no
270. Hagman, NEPA's Progeny Inhabit the States - Were the Genes Defective?, 7
URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1974); Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts, 3
ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. 50090 (1973).
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experience at either environmental assessment or legal defense.27' The
costs of an attack can be sizeable, not to mention the delay.272 Even where
challengers fail to succeed on the final merits, the trauma of litigation
can often stymie plans due to frustration and inflating project costs. If
litigation under the HCDA finds a receptive ear in the courts, the
widespread effect may be to encourage communities to engage in low
profile activities, aimed at minimal compliance with program
requirements, perfunctory environmental assessment and relocation
assistance - in short, evading major problems and major controversies
wherever possible. Unfortunately, such a result may have the negative
effect of returning us to the same pitfalls encountered under categorical
grants where communities once again are constrained to ignore their
priority problems. On the other hand, if recipients see their respon-
sibilities at the outset and plan accordingly, they should find their
program defensible and immune from judicial interference. Certainly it
must be recognized that the potential for litigation under the HCDA will
be based entirely on actions of the applicants. The applicants will not be
able to take shelter under the "rubber stamp" approval of HUD and
must therefore aggressively seek to comply with the letter and spirit of
the Act.
Once a controversy turns to the courts, parties in community
development litigation carry a very serious burden: the burden to make
community development work rather than sacrificing the potential for
improvement of urban life that might have been available with HCDA
funds. The law, in many respects, is quite rigid and litigation strategies
often lead toward mandating the loss of funds as where, for example, the
subject of the lawsuit is to prove that the application was arbitrarily
approved. In such cases parties would do well to consider negotiation
that may tend to be much more flexible than federal court orders. Such a
situation might arise if a community programs no residential
rehabilitation in the face of a large stock of vacant but substandard
dwelling units and a housing need that could not be satisfied by the most
imaginative of housing assistance plans. It may well be that under a
proper set of facts a court would find application approval improper
and enjoin the expenditure of HCDA funds. This counter-productive
remedy could be avoided if the parties could negotiate a mid-year
271. See Note, HUD's NEPA Responsibilities, supra note 234, at 198-200.
272. Cf. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'dsub. nom.
Alycska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (environmental suit
stated to have consumed over 4,500 attorney hours).
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amendment of the CD application to make a greater commitment to
rehabilitation. This type of negotiation strategy, at all stages of the
process, can be far more imaginative,7 3 challenging and productive
than an unwavering litigation strategy that could spell serious delay and
a lost opportunity to improve this nation's communities.
273. See generally Huffman, The Opportunities for Environmentalists in the Settlement
of NEPA Suits, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL L. R'. 50001 (1974). An example of an innovative and
successful negotiation strategy is the community development litigation in Edison, New
Jersey. It is reported that a consent orderhas been filed in the case which challenged citizen
participation and program priorities under the community's $152,000 grant. The city has
agreed to change its participation procedures and has guaranteed that in its second year
expenditures of $100,000 for site improvements in certain residential neighborhoods will
be made and that $70,000 would be spent for rehabilitation grants and loans during 1976
and 1977. In addition, the city will spend $4,000 to study possible improvement of a public
housing project and will make certain improvements including the installation of new
siding and a new sewer line regardless of the outcome of the study. NAACP v. Hills, Civil
No. 75-1461 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 22, 1975), reported in 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 422 (1975).
consent order and settlement reported in 3 HOUSING & DEv REP CURRENT DEV. 865 (D.N.J.,
Jan. 14, 1976).
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